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Abstract
Researchers have recently noted college students fail validity measures and base rate data
are needed for students meeting Slick et al.’s criteria (1999) for malingering. The association
between meeting Slick Criteria and subsequent recommendations (i.e., to receive external gain)
is unknown as is the diagnostic utility of embedded validity indices in this population. The
authors utilized archival data from: 1) a university psychological clinic (n = 986) and 2) a
university student control sample (n = 182). Measures included the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale-III, Wechsler Memory Scale-III, and Personality Assessment Inventory. Empirically
supported embedded validity indices were utilized to retrospectively identify suspected
malingering patients. Group performance, according to level of symptom credibility and level of
incentive seeking, was evaluated through a series of multivariate mean comparisons. Data are
presented for frequency of falling in the noncredible range on all validity indices. Diagnostic
statistics for each index are presented according to hypothetical base rates. Examination of
receiving psychological recommendations to obtain external incentive (i.e., academic
accommodations, medications, etc.) is reported according to incentive and credibility level.
University patients explicitly seeking external gain, particularly those meeting criteria for
malingering, demonstrated lower performance on the measures and received a higher rate of
recommendations for academic accommodations and/or medications than patients not seeking
external incentive. Nevertheless, a number of diagnostic statistics indicated some embedded
validity indices lack specificity for malingering in university samples. The current study supports
classifying patients according to level of incentive seeking when evaluating neurocognitive
performance and feigned or exaggerated deficits.

vi

Introduction and Review of Literature
Studies of response biases in psychology have evolved over time. Early clinical studies
and applications largely addressed how self-report biases were manifested in an individual’s
psychological symptom presentation via symptom minimization or exaggeration (i.e., faking
good, faking bad), and subsequently influence case conceptualization for treatment and
healthcare utilization planning (Meehl & Hathaway, 1946). Thus, common terms such as
symptom exaggeration or symptom magnification provided clinical insight into an individual’s
style of reporting symptoms. While still used in that manner, the study of response biases has
expanded as the clinical practice of psychology has rapidly encroached into forensic endeavors
within the past twenty years. In fact, Sweet, Peck, Abromowitz, and Etzweiler (2002) estimated
that practicing clinical neuropsychologists spend an average of nearly 10 hours per week
involved with forensic activities.
As psychological testimony regarding clinical cases is often proffered as legal evidence,
its accuracy and validity have repeatedly been subjected to scrutiny. This has led to applying
various legal precedents to expert testimony to establish admissibility and legal acceptability
standards in court (i.e., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993; Frye v. United States,
1923; Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 1999). One aspect of this matter entails whether or not a given
individual who has undergone psychological evaluation has presented him- or herself in an
honest fashion to the expert psychologist, and legal challenges frequently regard accurately
interpreting psychological test data in the courtroom. This issue is particularly pressing in cases
involving potential monetary and/or civil liberties implications.
Among other circumstances, the context of such expert testimony may include rendering
opinions in simple civil litigation, complex disability determination, evaluating
neuropsychological sequelae of traumatic brain injury (TBI) secondary to motor vehicle
1

accidents, or giving opinions regarding level of cognitive status following chemical exposure.
Psychological testimony is often used by vested legal parties to ascribe legal responsibility for
damages with the hope of obtaining compensation for those damages. In such cases there is
usually at least one party (e.g., a claimant) alleging psychological injury in order to benefit from
a secondary gain. Such a clear external incentive may serve as an influential factor in how an
individual claimant presents psychologically, especially when monetary settlements or damage
awards are proportional to the degree of injury that the claimant demonstrates. It then follows
that persons undergoing psychological evaluation while seeking psychological and/or
neuropsychological damage awards potentially have an interest in presenting with impairments.
Consequently, there are significant implications for identifying, quantifying, and then accounting
for negative response biases in psychological testing within the legal arena to recognize
illegitimate claims (i.e., identify those with noncredible performance). On a societal level,
noncredible neurocognitive performance has been shown to have substantial costs. It is estimated
that feigned behavior is present in nearly 20% of all cases presenting for medical care each year,
which results in nearly $5 billion for associated legal and medical expenses (Ford, 1983;
Gouvier, Lees-Haley, & Hammer, 2003).
In their survey of clinical neuropsychology diplomates, Mittenberg et al. (2002) reported
that out of 33, 531 patients, malingering prevalence ranged from 8% of medical cases to 35% of
fibromyalgia/chronic fatigue cases, with high rates for disability, litigation, and criminal cases as
well. Those percentages are an average across referral sources, and are particularly high in cases
being referred from defense oriented sources in cases involving civil litigation. Moreover,
Ardolf, Denney, and Houston (2007) recently reported that the combined rate of malingered
neurocognitive dysfunction (MND) was 54.3% for a sample of serially referred criminal
defendants. According to Mittenberg et al. (2002) the rate is much lower in patients not involved
2

with litigation or seeking compensation (approximately 7%). However, malingering prevalence
rates vary widely across settings, and are influenced by factors including reason for referral and
referral source (Bigler, 2006; Mittenberg et al., 2002). Not only that, but researchers have noted
that neurocognitive complaints and symptom exaggeration (i.e., disrupted attention and
concentration) occur in psychiatric groups, head injured individuals, and normal participants
(Delis & Wetter, 2007; Gouvier, Cubic, Jones, & Brantley, 1992; Kirmayer & Sartorius, 2007;
Lees-Haley, Earnest, & Dolezal-Wood, 1995).
In addition to exaggerating or fabricating symptoms for legal claims, there are multiple
sources of external secondary gain (e.g., making insurance claims, avoiding military duty) that
may prompt individuals to employ a negative response bias, which may affect the likelihood of
malingering. However, malingering research most often pertains to legal settings, as the
consequences for successful malingering under those circumstances are dramatic and typically
involve multiple parties. Other areas of non-financial external secondary gain (e.g., medicationseeking, opportunity for service utilization) have gone relatively unstudied until recently (Henry,
2005; Osmon, Plambeck, Klein, & Mano, 2006).
Just as effort and financial incentives have been shown to account for significant variance
in neuropsychological test performance (Binder & Rohling, 1996; Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley,
& Allen, 2001), it is thought that other forms of incentive are also related to neuropsychological
performance. Therefore, the current project seeks to explore the effects of non-financial external
gain on popular neuropsychological tests in a young adult clinical sample with the expectation
that performance in individuals overtly seeking non-financial incentives in the context of
evaluations is poorer than in individuals not expressing potential for external gain. Moreover, it
is likely the case that individuals expressing potential for non-financial external gain have a
higher proportion of noncredible performance on test validity measures given symptom
3

exaggeration may be higher in such a population in order to obtain external gain. Thus, the
application of existing methods for detecting noncredible neuropsychological performance needs
to be extended to other populations without financial gain to explore effects of incentive level as
it can be conceptualized on a continuum.
In this project, the author briefly describes a contemporary definition of malingering
along with common and novel methods for detecting noncredible neurocognitive performance
with particular emphasis on using traditional neuropsychological measures. Through that
description, the author discusses the application of those methods to populations not involved in
legal or other financial-seeking populations. Next, the author provides a discussion of literature
weaknesses and strengths, and presents an overview of research of noncredible neurocognitive
performance as it relates to sources of non-financial external gain in academic settings. Finally, a
rationale for the current data analyses follows to address concerns raised by obvious gaps in the
current literature. In particular, the author discusses identifying non-financial compensation
seeking behavior in relation to noncredible neurocognitive performance and offers specific
hypotheses for the project.
Defining Malingering and Noncredible Neurocognitive Performance
While the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR;
APA, 2000) contains criteria for defining malingering as a v-code (not a diagnosis of a mental
disorder per se), that description is considered by many to be inexact and vague. In response,
researchers have offered other definitions and commentary to help guide clinical and forensic
practice (Bianchini, Mathias, & Greve, 2001; Boone, 2007b; Greiffenstein, Baker, & Gola, 1994;
Slick, Sherman, & Iverson, 1999). Among the formal definitions, Slick et al. (1999) have
proposed the most cited and widely applied classification scheme of noncredible neurocognitive
performance, referred to as the Slick Criteria. According to Slick et al. (1999), MND is “the
4

volitional exaggeration or fabrication of cognitive dysfunction for the purpose of obtaining
substantial material gain, or avoiding or escaping formal duty or responsibility.” (p. 552). Their
system includes three categories of malingering based on the degree of evidence and level of
certainty that an individual is actually malingering. The categories range from possible to
probable to definite malingering, with the definite category representing the highest degree of
certainty that an individual is in fact malingering neurocognitive impairment.
In order to classify an individual according to one of those levels of malingering, that
person must display specific behaviors falling along four distinct areas outlined by Slick et al.
(1999). The first level of evidence (Criterion A) requires that the individual has a substantial
external incentive to display a response bias at the time of evaluation. Criterion B specifies that
within the context of a substantial incentive, there must be direct evidence of a response bias
from objective neuropsychological testing. Criterion C requires the presence of a response bias
from a self-report source (e.g., personality inventory). Finally, Criterion D stipulates that
Criterion B and/or Criterion C data are not fully accounted for by psychiatric, neurological, or
developmental factors.
In application, there are several combinations of Criterion B and C evidence that may be
employed in order to classify an individual as a malingerer. For example, Slick et al. (1999)
further subdivided Criterion B evidence (neuropsychological data) into six areas: 1) a definite
response bias (i.e., below chance, p < .05), on one or more forced-choice tests, 2) a probable
response bias represented by results from a “well-validated” test or index, 3) a discrepancy
between current neuropsychological test results and objective profiles of known brain function
and dysfunction, 4) discrepancy between test results and actual behaviors, 5) discrepancy
between test results and informant reports, or 6) discrepancy between test results and the
individual’s known history. Therefore, meeting Criterion B is possible via six different ways.
5

Similarly, Criterion C is subdivided thusly: 1) self-reported history does not reflect documented
history, 2) self-reported symptom endorsement is inconsistent with known patterns of brain
functioning, 3) self-reported symptoms are inconsistent with current behavior, 4) self-reported
symptoms are inconsistent with report from collateral contacts, or 5) there is evidence of
symptoms exaggeration or fabrication on “well-validated” self-report measures.
The term definite MND refers to meeting A, B1 (below chance performance on
neuropsychological testing), and D criteria. Meeting the classification criteria for probable
malingering can be done in two ways. In both cases, the individual must have a substantial
external incentive to appear impaired (Criterion A) and the findings from Criterion B and C are
not secondary to known bonafide disorders (Criterion D). In the first case, a probable malingerer
also meets two or more criteria from any one of B1-B6. In the second case, a probable
malingerer also meets one criterion from neuropsychological testing (any of B1-B6) and one
from self-report testing (any of C1-C5). The third, and least stigmatizing level of malingering,
possible, is described as initially meeting Criterion A. Then, the individual must demonstrate at
least any one of Criterion C level evidence and either the Criterion C behaviors meet Criterion D
or criteria for definite or probable MND is met except that the behaviors in question may be
partially explained by an actual disorder (Criterion D). While the diagnostic criteria is more
liberal when applying a malingering label according to the Slick et al. (1999) criteria as one
moves from definite to possible malingering, the level of certainty that an individual is really
malingering may decrease accordingly. Additionally, if one does not meet Criterion A, but still
satisfies all or part of Criteria B or C, the validity and credibility of performance would be called
into question, but the person would not be labeled as a malingerer, but likely a factitious disorder
instead.
Despite obtaining a high level of certainty of determining MND, undesirable and
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unintended consequences are likely to occur as a result of labeling (Murphy, 1976;
Thornicroft, Rose, Kassam, & Sartorius, 2007), especially when one is labeled a malingerer
(Szasz, 1956). For instance, the dangers of mislabeling someone as a malingerer may include
losing legitimate workers’ compensation, disability, pensions, accommodations, needed
healthcare services, or loss of liberty (Yelin, 1986). Furthermore, once that label has been
applied, any future medical or legal claims made by the individual will likely be skeptically
viewed. Consequently, using the term malingering in clinical settings is disfavored by many
neuropsychologists (Slick, Tan, Strauss, & Hultsch, 2004). Rather, when clinicians are
confronted with poor effort consistent with MND, they tend to indicate that test results are
invalid, are inconsistent with the severity of the injury, that the results are indicative of
exaggeration, or are noncredible (Boone, 2007b; Slick et al., 2004). In following that line of
thinking against undue stigmatization, research and clinical practice recommendations in this
field of study stress avoiding false positive findings of noncredible performance to avert
subjecting clients to potentially harmful consequences (Bush et al., 2005).
Methods of Detecting Noncredible Neurocognitive Performance
As the study of malingering has evolved, so too have the methods of detecting invalid
performance on psychological tests. There are several methods of evaluating malingered
performance including behavioral observations, statistical techniques, qualitative analyses, and
clinical records review among others. There are also specialized instruments to detect such
performance. Specialized instruments usually represent techniques including symptom validity
testing, performance curve, atypical performance on tests, floor effects methods, and validity
indices. While those malingering-specific tests represent a unique class of instruments designed
for a single purpose, there has also been an effort to detect noncredible performance indirectly,
utilizing widely used neuropsychological measures.
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Determining the usefulness of this indirect approach requires investigation of how the
procedures perform in disparate samples across settings. Just as there is no single, sufficient
method or technique for detecting noncredible cognitive performance in a given case, there is no
uniformly agreed upon statistical or methodological procedure for establishing the usefulness of
the various techniques. Rather, most researchers use multiple strategies (Ashendorf, O'Bryant, &
McCaffrey, 2003; Bush et al., 2005; Iverson & Binder, 2000; Nies & Sweet, 1994) that have
been established by how well they identify individuals from known groups of noncredible
responders. In this manner, tests and measures used to identify noncredible responding are held
to the same standards as measures used to document the claimant’s impairments and disability.
Therefore, classification and error rates of psychological procedures must also be reported to
demonstrate test effectiveness (Gouvier, 1999, 2001; Gouvier, Hayes, & Smiroldo, 1998). The
emphasis in this line of research is as much on the performance of the instruments as it is on the
persons who complete them.
Consequently, evaluation of diagnostic prediction in this research area generally follows
methods applied to the usefulness of medical tests that account for the sensitivity and specificity
of tests (Baldessarini, Finklestein, & Arana, 1983). Whereas sensitivity refers to the ability of a
measure to accurately detect true cases of a phenomenon, specificity is concerned with the ability
of an instrument to accurately detect true non-cases. For instance, a test that correctly identifies
all cases of a condition and does not identify any individual without the condition as having the
condition, has perfect sensitivity (100% or 1.00) and specificity (100% or 1.00).
Accordingly, a test that deviates from perfect sensitivity and specificity results in
incorrect classification of those who actually have the condition and those not having the
condition. For illustration, if a test developed for early cancer detection had a sensitivity of .95
and specificity of .60, it would fail to detect cancer in 5% of those that actually have cancer
8

(false negatives) and would detect cancer in 40% of those who do not have the cancer (false
positives). Therefore, a test with high sensitivity and low specificity would be sure to “catch” the
condition early in most cases, but would also suggest cancer was present in those who actually
do not have cancer, resulting in a test that “cries wolf” more often than it misses true cases.
While such a scenario for a test may be desirable in some cases, such as making sure to identify
life-threatening conditions early in the disease process, it may not be appropriate when there are
notable negative consequences for those misidentified as having the conditions (i.e., tissue
biopsies, quarantine, etc.). In the case of being labeled a malingerer, researchers have generally
assumed that a 90% specificity level is appropriate to avoid undue stigmatization and other
undesirable social and economic consequences (Babikian, Boone, Lu, & Arnold, 2006; Bianchini
et al., 2001), but others consider a 10% false positive rate far too high (Langeluddecke & Lucas,
2004).
However, sensitivity and specificity are not the only values to consider when determining
the usefulness of a test. Several commentators have emphasized that the effectiveness of a test
also lies in its ability to improve diagnostic decision across varying base rates (Baldessarini et
al., 1983; Bar-Hillel & Hogarth, 1990; Faust & Nurcombe, 1989; Gouvier, 1999, 2001; Gouvier
et al., 1998) because the confidence of diagnostic decisions are dramatically influenced by the
proportion of the population that presently has a condition. When sensitivity, specificity, and
condition base rate are all considered in individual cases, decisions can reflect the degree of
probability that a condition is present when a test indicates it is present (positive predictive
values) and the probability of the condition not being present, as indicated by the test (negative
predictive value). For example, in low base rate conditions, even tests with high specificity and
sensitivity values may not improve accuracy over decisions grounded in base rates alone.
Therefore, if sensitivity and specificity values have been established, test effectiveness, in terms
9

of positive and negative predictive values, can be calculated for a number of hypothetical base
rate conditions. In this way, metrics are created that provide a level of probability indicating a
given condition is or is not present depending upon a test finding. Therefore, research in the
MND arena often contains values relating to diagnostic accuracy in order to demonstrate test
effectiveness.
In the following section, the author briefly describes some of the specialized measures to
detect malingering and then discusses empirically derived adaptation of traditional
neuropsychological testing to that end. Throughout that discussion the reader is reminded that the
phrase “well-validated” malingering instrument has a variety of meanings depending on the
intentions and skepticism of the user (Green, 2007). Nevertheless, clinical usage of the
procedures is informed by values supportive of diagnostic utility and effectiveness.
Symptom Validity Testing
Symptom Validity Testing is a methodology utilizing tests with forced-choice response
formats (i.e., True/False, Multiple Choice) with responses representing unambiguously correct or
incorrect answers. Since the early work of Hiscock and Hiscock (1989), adapted from Pankratz,
Fausti, and Peed (1975) and Pankratz’s (1979) procedures and methodology to identify
conversion symptoms, symptom validity testing has held platinum status as the only certain way
to identify MND (Bianchini et al., 2001). This set of procedures is founded on the statistical
principle that an individual, given the opportunity to respond in a forced-choice format, should
not respond incorrectly to more items than would be expected from random chance responding at
the p < .05 level. If an individual does respond below the level predicted by chance, then it is
thought that performance surely indicates a deliberate (or definite) attempt to respond incorrectly
(Reynolds, 1998; Slick et al., 1999). However, below chance performance is rare in cases of
known MND and most likely found in those making unsophisticated attempts at feigning. It is
10

known to be especially sensitive to coaching as a preventative intervention (for a discussion see
Boone, 2007b; Youngjohn, 1995). Thus more sophisticated or idiosyncratic attempts at feigning
likely go unidentified if relying solely on this type of testing.
Interpretation of symptom validity test performance can also be conducted to consider
low performance that is not below chance levels, but is below performance of individuals with
known neurocognitive dysfunction (Binder, 1993). Through this approach, it is possible to make
inferences regarding clinically meaningful low performance by establishing optimal critical
cutoff scores that differentiate those with established impairments and those displaying
malingered/noncredible performance. By using those scores, tests can then be investigated
according to their level of classification accuracy based on a number of factors. Such symptom
validity tests include the Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 1997), Victoria Symptom
Validity Test (Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Spellacy, 1996), and Portland Digit Recognition Test
(Binder, 1993).
Performance Curve, the Floor Effect, and Atypical Performance
Most neuropsychological and cognitive tests contain a collection of items and procedures
that vary in degree of complexity and difficulty (Lezak, Howieson, Loring, Hannay, & Fischer,
2004). This is particularly true of standardized achievement and intellectual functioning
measures (Wechsler, 1997a; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2001) as well as specialized
neuropsychological instruments (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Many of those tests tend to
have easy items at the beginning of sets and conclude with more difficult items. Thus, the
examiner can expect typical clients to miss progressively more items toward the latter portion of
tests, rather than observing the opposite pattern. If the level of difficult items passed exceeds an
expected level relative to easier items, then inferences can be made regarding the level of effort
during testing (Rogers, 1997). Procedures using this rationale include the Dot Counting Test
11

(Rey, 1941), Validity Indicator Profile (Frederick, 1997), as well as qualitative analyses of
performance (Johnstone & Cooke, 2003).
The easiest items of a neuropsychological test identify the “floor” or the most basic level
of abilities measured by a test. Therefore, most individuals can be expected to complete them
correctly at an exceptionally high rate. Similarly, tests of noncredible performance have been
developed that appear difficult, but are actually quite simple with successful performance
requiring a low level of cognitive skill. On such tasks (e.g., Rey 15-Item Test; Rey, 1941) even
individuals who have sustained significant levels of acquired brain injury, experience pain, or are
poorly educated perform well. If an individual does perform poorly on those items or tests,
especially when compared to groups of neurologically compromised individuals, poor effort is
suspected.
Related to floor effect and performance curve methods, the atypical performance methods
rely on extant knowledge of brain functioning to identify noncredibility. One of the assumptions
about memory functioning is that it is easier to recognize learned information than it is to retrieve
learned information in a free-recall format (Binder, Villanueva, Howieson, & Moore, 1993).
Given this general finding, it is unexpected that an individual’s level of ability to recognize
recently learned information is compromised relative to free-recall regardless of the level of
neurological insult. Therefore, one would not expect to obtain results suggesting poorer
recognition memory as opposed to recall memory. Moreover, recent investigations by Hilsabeck,
LeCompte, Marks, and Grafman (2001) have capitalized on the findings that implicit memory
remains largely intact even in amnesic patients. As a result, failure to learn and remember
implicit information raises suspicion of suboptimal effort. Another method involves examining
the differences between attention and memory performance under the assumption that attentional
resources are required for learning and remembering information (Butters, Salmon, Cullum, &
12

Cairns, 1988). Therefore, poor attention relative to memory performance is also a marker for
poor effort (Hilsabeck et al., 2003; Mittenberg, Azrin, Millsaps, & Heilbronner, 1993). Lastly,
auditory attention span also remains relatively uncompromised by a host of neurological insults
such as amnesia (Baddeley & Warrington, 1970), dementia (Carlesimo, Fadda, Lorusso, &
Caltagirone, 1994), or pain (Wade & Hart, 2002), which also makes that area of functioning an
attractive addition to malingering investigation (Greiffenstein et al., 1994).
Validity Indices
Conventionally, the use of validity indices has referred to a set of internal scales of a test
for assessing the consistency, reliability, and honesty of performance. This type of approach is
most often used in self-report personality tests or questionnaires to ensure that individuals have
responded consistently to items with similar content (Morey, 1991; Tellegen et al., 2003).
However, other types of invalid responses include endorsing more severe symptoms than those
with demonstrated physical or psychological problems, denying common problems that most
people admit to experiencing, or reporting extremely bizarre or infrequent symptoms suggestive
of fabrication. It is assumed that the validity indices of self-report inventories add information
regarding a respondent’s response style, which can be utilized to make inferences regarding the
manner in which they report psychological matters in general (i.e., under- or over-endorsement).
For instance, if an individual endorsed a higher number of items on a scale developed to assess
an exaggerated or negative impression (extreme or bizarre symptoms), then it is expected the
individual responded to many other items in that manner, thus presenting a biased view of their
current psychological status. The idea of including validity indices in neuropsychological tests
has also received empirical attention (Boone, 2007b) as has the inclusion of indices on selfreport measures to detect malingered cognitive status (Larrabee, 1998, 2003b).
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The Use of Standardized Neuropsychological Measures in Malingering Detection
Neuropsychological instruments provide quantitative and qualitative data regarding
particular domains of cognitive functioning (Mitrushina, Boone, Razani, & D'Elia, 2005; Strauss,
Sherman, & Spreen, 2006). Most traditional neuropsychological measures are developed to
primarily survey singular cognitive domains (Lezak et al., 2004). For example, the Rey Auditory
Verbal Learning Test (Rey, 1964) was developed to assess learning and memory for orally
presented words. In addition to unidimensionally focused tests, instruments containing multiple
subtests assessing several cognitive domains, such as intelligence tests and executive functioning
tests (Delis et al., 2001; Wechsler, 1997a), are typically administered to derive a profile of
cognitive strengths and weaknesses across mental abilities. Patterns of performance on such tests
have been examined for their use in detecting noncredible performance. Those investigations
have usually been validated against criteria derived according to the principles mentioned above
(i.e., atypical response patterns, deviation from known brain functioning, etc.).
There are several reasons for including validity indices derived from existing measures of
neurocognitive ability. Using standard neuropsychological tests to glean information regarding
individuals’ effort level decreases administration time of testing batteries when administration of
additional validity measures might be unduly burdensome. One reason that time is a limiting
factor to consider in clinical practice is that administration of a neuropsychological battery often
requires a significant commitment (several hours). This is a potential burden for both the
clinician and client. The evaluation process can be extended substantially with the addition of
standalone validity tests; thus, having “built in” validity measures can decrease the time of test
administration. This is important because in order for results of psychological testing and
neuropsychological procedures to be useful, they generally require patience, attention,
cooperation, and sometimes endurance (Johnson, Lange, DeLuca, Korn, & Natelson, 1997;
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Lezak et al., 2004) on the part of the client, all of which can be negatively affected by extended
testing. For example, one widely used validity measure, the Portland Digit Recognition Test
(Binder & Willis, 1991), requires roughly 45 minutes to complete in a forensic
neuropsychological evaluation that typically requires over a day of testing.
Beyond the fact that testing can cause fatigue and may be aversive to the client,
professional and market pressures require time efficient evaluations. For example, third party
reimbursement for additional validity testing is unlikely (Piotrowski, Belter, & Keller, 1998),
even for government mandated disability evaluations (such as in Louisiana), which makes it
unlikely that validity tests are given in the majority of cases (Chafetz, Abrahams, & Kohlmaier,
2007). While approximately 79% of surveyed “expert” clinical neuropsychologists in North
America commonly use at least one validity measure (Slick et al., 2004), the percentage used by
other practicing psychologists is unknown, but is likely less. In fact, Sharland and Gfeller (2007)
conducted a more recent survey of clinical neuropsychologists and reported that only 24.9%
always, 30.7% often, and 28.6% sometimes include some type of validity measure in a
neuropsychological evaluation. This is potentially problematic given the high rates of suspected
noncredibility across settings, as testing effort and financial incentives have been shown to
account for significant variance in neuropsychological test performance (Binder & Rohling,
1996; Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2001).
Moreover, validity markers within a given test can allow more sophisticated inferences
made about performance on that test (Mathias, Greve, Bianchini, Houston, & Crouch, 2002). For
instance, when conducting retrospective chart reviews where no specialized validity testing was
administered, the reviewer can calculate and use derived validity index scores to infer effort
level, which is often necessary in forensic cases. Despite the advantages of using embedded
measures of validity, they remain among the least used validity detection methods by
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neuropsychologists when making a decision of noncredibility and many neuropsychologists do
not even know about them (Sharland & Gfeller, 2007). Regardless, developing indicators of
noncredibility for popular multiscale intelligence and memory tests has received considerable
research attention.
Embedded Validity Indicators
The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997a),
Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997b), and earlier versions of
those tests (WAIS-R/WMS-R; Wechsler, 1981, 1987), are among the most popular adult
intelligence and memory tests used by psychologists and neuropsychologists (Archer,
Buffington-Vollum, Stredny, & Handel, 2006; Lees-Haley, Smith, Williams, & Dunn, 1996).
Additionally, the WAIS-III is the most commonly administered measure by clinical
neuropsychologists with the WMS-III closely following as the second most used (Rabin, Barr, &
Burton, 2005). Therefore, developing embedded detection methods and noncredibility indices in
these two instruments has the potential to add meaningful information to routine evaluations
given such wide popularity and test usage patterns.
Several attempts have been made to use aspects of those measures for detecting
noncredible responses. Within that area of study, researchers have outlined how those embedded
approaches may be used in order to meet requirements for specific level(s) of evidence (Criterion
B) according to the Slick et al. (1999) criteria (Bianchini et al., 2001; Etherton, Bianchini,
Heinly, & Greve, 2006; Larrabee, 2007a; Millis, 2004). Data regarding performance and
classification accuracy of derived measures have been reported across multiple clinical,
experimental, and normative samples.
Digit Span Measures
For ease of review, selected embedded digit span indices with corresponding diagnostic
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statistics across research studies are presented in Table 1. As noted above, auditory attentional
span remains relatively spared in individuals with a range of neurological problems (Wilde,
Strauss, & Tulsky, 2004). Given that finding, suspicion of noncredibility is raised when
individuals perform very poorly on measures of that ability. While there are several tests
available to assess auditory attentional span via a digit repetition method (Benton, Sivan,
Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1994; Randolph, 1998), they all generally require participants to
repeat increasingly longer strings of numbers that the examiner presents verbally. Examination
of noncredible behavior using digit span tests has followed several lines of study as researchers
have investigated a wide variety of particular types of performance including those based on agecorrected scaled scores, digit span forward, digit span backward, maximum digit span forward,
maximum digits backward, time to complete single trials, total number of digits completed, digit
span performance in relation to other subtest performance, and maximum length of consistently
accurate performance, a.k.a. reliable digit span (Reliable Digits) (Babikian & Boone, 2007).
Since digit span performance is assessed by the WAIS-R, WAIS-III, and WMS-III, the
majority of malingering research applications of digit span has been conducted using those
measures. The administration, scoring, and response formats for those tests is very similar
between the older and newer versions, and the current WAIS-III/WMS-III versions of the Digit
Span subtests are identical to one another. Therefore, findings from early research are readily
generalizable to those measures.
In this section, the author reports research regarding each of the well-studied digit span
methods in turn. Throughout the literature, researchers’ methodologies and sample
characteristics vary from using unselected patients, patients displaying known noncredible
performance, undergraduates who received instructions to malinger their performance,
community control samples, and/or those with acquired brain injuries. Although some
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researchers have examined many of the digit span indices in isolation, others have also taken a
broader glance at how they perform together in terms of classification rates for MND.
Digit Span Age-Corrected Scaled Scores. In relation to college students instructed to
perform their best, participants instructed to malinger have shown lower age-corrected scaled
scores on the Wechsler Digit Span subtest (Bernard, 1990; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt,
1978). Early classification studies of age-corrected scaled scores began with undergraduate
analogue malingering research studies reported by Iverson and Franzen (Iverson, 1991; 1994). In
their comparison of head injured and memory impaired patients (n = 28), simulating college
students (n = 21), and simulating inmates (n = 35), a 1% false positive rate (misidentifying
nonmalingerers as malingerers) was found for age-corrected scaled scores < 4 and a 2% false
positive rate was found for scores < 5. Correct classification rates for malingerers were 82.5%
and 90% respectively. Mean scores per group were as follows: simulating college students (M =
2.3, SD = 1.9), simulating inmates (M = 3.1, SD = 1.4), and the neurological patients (M = 8.3,
SD = 2.3). Additional control groups with students (n = 21) and inmates (n = 38) resulted in
normative performance for both groups (students, M = 10.7, SD = 1.8; inmates, M = 10.7, SD =
2.5). Iverson and Franzen (1996) also used a cutoff score of < 4 resulting in a 77.5% sensitivity
and specificity of 100% for identifying simulated malingering in psychiatric patients (n = 20; M
= 2.64, SD = 1.42) and simulating college students (n = 20; M = 2.8, SD = 2.59) as well as a
control group of clinical noncompensation seeking neurological patients (n = 20; M = 8.15, SD =
2.83) instructed to give their best effort. Orey, Cragar, and Berry (2000) have also shown that
simulating college students generally perform approximately one standard deviation below the
normative standard (M = 7.92, SD = 2.92).
More recently, Vickery et al. (2004) assigned participants, from a sample of 46
individuals with demonstrated moderate to severe traumatic brain injury (M-STBI), to two
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groups. One M-STBI group was instructed to malinger on neuropsychological testing (n = 23)
and one M-STBI group served as a control group (n = 23). Another sample of 46 community
volunteers was matched to the M-STBI group on the basis of demographics and they were also
assigned to either a simulation experimental group (n = 23) or a control group (n = 23). To
increase the external validity of the experiment, the authors provided financial incentives for
compliance with the instructional sets. In the context of other neuropsychological measures, the
simulating M-STBI group had significantly lower age-corrected scaled scores (M = 7.7,
SD = 2.3) than the control M-STBI group (M = 8.3, SD = 2.4). They also reported that a group of
simulating community malingerers performed at similar low levels (M = 7.4, SD = 2.2) to the MSTBI malingerers, and well below community control volunteers (M = 10.9, SD = 3.2).
Other researchers have focused on reporting mean scores and classification accuracy
rates in groups of clinical patients suspected of providing noncredible performance. In a
preliminary study, Rawling and Brooks (1990) reported data on 16 severe cases of head injury
contrasted with a “simulation” group consisting of 16 matched patients with mild traumatic brain
injury (MTBI) suspected of feigning. Descriptive results from a full neuropsychological
evaluation were provided. Based on those data, though no formal statistics were conducted, digit
span appeared to be the lowest performed subtest from the WAIS-R that separated the groups
with patients showing poor effort scoring lower than even the severely injured patients. While
they described a follow-up validation study with additional patients, they did not report WAIS-R
subtest information regarding those other patients.
Trueblood and Schmidt (1993) used a Digit Span age-corrected scaled score cutoff of < 7
when differentiating MTBI malingerers (n = 8; based on the Hiscock & Hiscock [1989] symptom
validity test), a group of MTBI patients with questionable validity (n = 8), and two matched
groups of nonmalingering MTBI patients (G1 n = 8, G2 n = 8). Their report of mean performance
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is as follows: MTBI malingerers (M = 5.9), MTBI patients with questionable validity (M = 5.8),
and the two MTBI control groups (MG1 = 8.9, MG2 = 10.8). In calculating operating
characteristics from their study, sensitivity was 62.5%, and specificity remained high at 99%
(one false positive). They also reported a 14.9% false positive rate (85% specificity) for an illdefined mixed clinical group (n = 74), but no additional data were provided from that portion of
their study. Trueblood (1994) later indicated that a cutoff of < 7 resulted in 86% specificity in
two matched clinical control groups (n = 22; MG1 = 8.3, MG2 = 10.5). There was a 75%
sensitivity for clients in a known clinical malingering group (n = 12, M = 4.8; based on the
Hiscock & Hiscock [1989] symptom validity test). That score also identified 8 of 10 clients with
questionably valid performance whose mean digit span scaled score was 5.6. One substantial
limitation of Trueblood’s (1994) study is that there was no information regarding neurological
status any of the samples.
Two other studies reported group scaled score means for the Digit Span subtest.
Youngjohn, Burrows, and Erdal (1995) reported that the Digit Span scaled score (M = 8.71, SD =
3.21) and Digit Symbol scaled score (M = 8.60, SD = 2.52) from subtests of the WAIS-R
represented the lowest subtests scores for a group of MTBI patients with persisting symptoms
seeking compensation (n = 55). No control or comparison groups were examined and no data
regarding symptom validity tests or other validity measures were provided. Suhr, Tranel, Wefel,
and Barrash (1997) reported digit span scaled score mean performance for a MTBI probable
malingering group in litigation (n = 31; based on the Hiscock & Hiscock [1989] symptom
validity test), a MTBI litigation control group (n = 30; nonmalingering), and a MTBI control
group not in litigation (n = 20). Again, Digit Span performance was lowest in the malingering
group (M = 6.3, SD = 2.4), but remained within normal limits for the litigating MTBI controls (M
= 9.1, SD = 2.7) and nonlitigating MTBI controls (M = 9.0, SD = 3.0). They also included Digit
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Span data from other small nonlitigating clinical control patients who endured severe head injury
(n = 15, M = 9.5, SD = 2.8), were diagnosed with depression (n = 30; M = 8.7, SD = 2.9), or had
significant somatic complaints (n = 29; M = 8.9, SD = 3.4). However, neither Youngjohn et al.
(1995) nor Suhr et al. (1997) provided information regarding classification accuracy related to
their Digit Span findings.
In more recent research, Heinly, Greve, Bianchini, Love, and Brennan (2005) reported
mean values for digit span scaled scores in a mixed group of TBI patients with mild to severe
injury. Slick et al.’s (1999) criteria (Slick Criteria) were applied to all patients utilizing the Test
of Memory Malingering, Portland Digit Recognition Test, California Verbal Learning Test,
unique responses to tests, and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – Second Edition as
evidence for MND. The groups consisted of patients with no incentive to malinger (n = 45, M =
10.48, SD = 3.76), non-MND patients with only incentive to malinger (n = 101; M = 9.74, SD =
2.88), suspected malingerers (n = 127; M = 8.40, SD = 2.60), probable malingerers (n = 53; M =
6.65, SD = 2.34), and those meeting Slick Criteria for definite MND (n = 12; M = 6.13, SD =
2.80). Sensitivity was low at 36%, but specificity 93% was excellent for Digit Span scaled scores
< 5 in comparing the entire TBI group with TBI patients determined to be malingerers. They also
indicated that, in a 20% base rate condition, a score of < 5 was associated with a 56% positive
predictive power. Their findings also revealed that scaled scores of < 5 were associated with
more false positives in patients who were elderly, had endured a cerebrovascular accident (14%
false positive rate), had substantiated severe memory disorders (10% false positive rate), were
diagnosed with a psychiatric condition (7% false positive rate), or had a diagnosis other than TBI
(10% false positive rate).
Babikian, Boone, Lu, and Arnold (2006) utilized a known groups design based on Slick
Criteria to investigate the classification accuracy in a mixed group of litigating psychiatric and
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neuropsychological patients with documented noncredible neuropsychological performance (n =
66). They used a combination of several validity measures to satisfy Slick Criteria including the
Dot Counting Test, Rey Word Recognition Test, b test, Word Memory Test, Rey’s 15-item test,
and the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test. They also used data from a clinical
neuropsychological control sample (n = 56) and nonclinical control sample (n = 32). The group
with noncredible performance was the worst among the groups on the Digit Span subtest (M =
6.2, SD = 3.1) with the clinical (M = 8.8, SD = 2.8) and non-clinical controls (M = 9.42, SD =
2.20) scoring higher. Investigation of Digit Span subtest of < 4 resulted in nearly perfect
specificity, but the cutoff score resulted in poor sensitivity (32%). However, when raised to < 5,
specificity was within an acceptable range (93% for clinic patients), while raising sensitivity
(42%) resulting in a positive predictive power of 51% in a 15% base rate condition.
Greve et al. (2007) examined Digit Span age-corrected scaled scores in a sample of
litigating patients claiming injuries secondary to toxic chemical exposure. They further
subdivided this group into a MND group (n = 46) based on Slick Criteria, an indeterminate group
comprised of those failing only one validity index (n = 39), and a nonmalingering group (n = 38).
They used multiple possible combinations across the Word Memory Test, Test of Memory
Malingering, Portland Digit Recognition Test, Computerized Assessment of response Bias,
California Verbal Learning Test, General Memory Index minus Attention/Concentration Index,
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–Second Edition, and Processing Speed Index to
classify individuals according to the Slick Criteria. Based on that classification, they reported
that the MND group (M = 6.56, SD = 2.71) scored lower than both the indeterminate group
(M = 8.09, SD = 2.21) and the clinical toxic claimant controls (M = 9.08, SD = 1.86). While
specificity of digit span age-corrected scaled scores < 4 was 100%, sensitivity was poor (22%).
When the cutoff score was raised to < 5, specificity was held at an acceptable level (93%) and
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sensitivity was raised to 46%, which resulted in a 59% positive predictive power at a 20% base
rate. The level of Digit Span scaled score performance of < 5 was associated with only a 36%
sensitivity and 97% specificity for differentiating MTBI and TBI groups from a known
malingering group (Axelrod, Fichtenberg, Millis, & Wertheimer, 2006).
Beyond clinical and experimental studies of digit span age-corrected scaled scores,
Iverson and Tulsky (2003) examined the WAIS-III/WMS-III standardization sample to
investigate base rates of low performance in the general population. Delineated by age bands,
they indicated that the cumulative percent of scaled scores < 4 in 1,000 young persons (ages 1634) was 2.2%, and remained low at 4.7% with a score of < 5. Moreover, only 3.4% of those
diagnosed with a significant neurological condition (n = 123; TBI, Korsakoff’s syndrome,
Alzheimer’s disease, temporal lobectomy, chronic alcoholism) reported in the technical manual
had a score < 5 with an average score of 10.1 (SD = 2.8).
Despite few false positives in neurologically impaired groups, Graue et al. (2007) called
into question using the digit span age-corrected scaled scores (< 5) procedure in individuals with
impaired intellectual functioning (Fullscale Intelligence Quotient [FSIQ] < 70) by conducting a
study of community volunteers. The first group served as a community control group with low
average intellectual functioning (n = 10; FSIQ M = 80.2) and the second community group
(n = 25; estimated FSIQ M = 82.1) was instructed to simulate mental retardation on a number of
tests including the WAIS-III. The control group was recruited from a local agency providing
services to individuals diagnosed with mental retardation (n = 26; FSIQ M = 60). Graue et al
(2007) compared groups based on a number of derived validity indices from the WAIS-III,
including age-corrected scaled score. Results indicated that the mental retardation simulation
group (M = 4.6, SD = 1.8) performed similarly to those diagnosed with mental retardation (M =
4.5, SD = 1.7) for age-corrected scores. As a result, the sensitivity (68%) and specificity (19%)
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were poor in discriminating the groups. These data support other recent work showing specificity
(81%) for scaled scores < 5 in a mixed group of patients with low intellectual functioning (n =
63, FSIQ < 79) who had no incentive to feign (Dean, Victor, Boone, & Arnold, 2007). If fact,
Dean et al. (2007) reported a 33% specificity level for that cutoff score in individuals with FSIQ
scores ranging from 50-69. Consequently, while research generally supports the use of scaled
scores < 5 as an acceptable cutoff score for identifying those giving poor effort, that score is not
appropriate to use with those who have intellectual disabilities.
Reliable Digit Span (Reliable Digits). Greiffenstein et al. (1994) developed the Reliable
Digits technique to optimally identify individuals with invalid performance. The authors
described the technique as follows: addition of the longest string of repeated digits with no error
over two trials in both forward and backward conditions. In their landmark study, the authors
studied a group largely composed of litigating patients referred by insurance companies and
attorneys claiming TBI deficits. They examined three groups: a TBI patient group (n = 33),
persistent postconcussion group (n = 30), and a malingering persistent postconcussion group
(n = 43). They identified the probable malingering group according to improbable performance
on two or more measures, disability in their social role, contradicting collateral reports and
symptom history, and remote memory loss. They reported that the malingering group performed
significantly lower (M = 6.7, SD = 1.2) than both the persistent postconcussion control group (M
= 8.9, SD = 1.1) and TBI control group (M = 8.8, SD = 1.2). They also reported choosing a cutoff
score based on performance -1.3 standard deviations in the TBI group (< 7). Their cutoff resulted
in 70% sensitivity and 73% specificity when comparing the malingering and TBI group, while
that score had 68% sensitivity and 89% specificity when comparing the malingering group with
the persistent postconcussion control group. Greiffenstein et al. (1994) also reported the base rate
for malingering was 57% among the TBI patients, and a base rate of 59% among the persistent
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postconcussion patients. Parenthetically, these participants were nearly all referred for
independent medical evaluations from insurance company defense attorneys.
Meyers and Volbrecht (1998) studied a group of patients with MTBI (n = 47) involved in
litigation with 49 referrals from treating physicians. They classified nine litigants as malingerers
according to a forced choice procedure. Among the nine malingerers identified, seven (77%)
were also identified by Reliable Digits < 7, while only 5% of those with credible performance
were misidentified as malingerers. In a later study, Meyers and Volbrecht (2003) incorporated
Reliable Digits < 6 into a decision tree among several other validity measures in a large clinical
sample that included 32 normal controls. While they reported classification accuracy for their
entire battery, they did not report any data specific to failure rates of Reliable Digits nor did they
report levels of performance on that measure.
Larrabee (2003a) also incorporated Reliable Digits into a battery of multiple validity
measures. He examined archival data from 24 closed head injured patients with definite MND
(meeting Slick Criteria using the Portland Digit Recognition Test, below p < .05 level). He then
compared that group to nonmalingering patients who suffered documented M-STBI (n = 27).
Among other validity measures, Reliable Digits < 7 was used to differentiate the known groups.
Reliable Digits showed a sensitivity of 50% and specificity of 93.5%. None of the control MSTBI scored < 6, while 23.1% of the patients in the known group were identified. He then crossvalidated the findings to additional clinical groups of similarly classified known definite (n = 24;
M = 7.37, SD = 1.92) and probable malingerers (n = 17; M = 6.82, SD = 1.67). They were
compared to credible patients with severe TBI (M = 8.87, SD = 1.13), MTBI (M = 10.00, SD =
2.22), mixed neurological problems (M = 10.62, 2.34), and psychiatric diagnoses (M = 9.79, SD
= 2.33). Those credible clinical groups were not significantly different from each other according
to Reliable Digits scores. Despite reporting classification rates according to Reliable Digits from
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the initial study, his follow-up cross-validation report lacked those data.
In their archival review of 151 workers’ compensation TBI referrals, Mathias et al.
(2002) administered at least one specialized malingering instrument (i.e., Test of Memory
Malingering, Portland Digit Recognition Test) and classified each client according to the Slick
Criteria. They further divided the patients into a control group with no incentive to feign and did
not meet Slick Criteria (n = 30) and into a probable MND group (n = 24). A Reliable Digits < 7
cutscore resulted in 67% sensitivity and 93% specificity with 68% positive predictive power and
91% negative predictive power in a 20% base rate condition. They also reported information
about the false positive cases, and indicated both cases had severe TBI and borderline intellectual
functioning (FSIQ < 80), suggesting increased false positives in persons with known
neurological compromise.
Duncan and Ausborn (2002) applied Reliable Digits to case records of adult males
(n = 187) in a forensic sample who had no evidence of neurological dysfunction. They
retrospectively identified each case as malingering (n = 54) or not malingering (n = 134) based
on self reports, interview, and the Rey 15-item test. They reported the malingering group (M =
5.81, SD = 3.40) performed lower than the credible group (M = 8.87 SD = 2.14) on Reliable
Digits. Using Reliable Digits < 6, sensitivity of identifying malingerers was 56.6% and
specificity was 90.3%. When raising the cutoff score to < 7, sensitivity was raised to 67.9%, but
specificity lowered to 71.6%.
Etherton, Bianchini, Greve, and Heinly (2005) conducted a records review of 200 pain
patients (most of whom had a financial incentive) referred by physicians, workers’
compensation, and attorneys. The patients were assigned to a nonmalingering pain sample (n =
53) if there was objective medical evidence of physiological damage associated with pain and no
evidence of self-report symptom exaggeration or poor performance on Test of Memory
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Malingering, Portland Digit Recognition Test, or Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory –
Second Edition. The definite MND group consisted of patients meeting Slick Criteria. They also
used an archival sample of M-STBI patients (n = 69) with no history of noncredible behavior. A
large portion of the M-STBI and control pain group had some sort of external incentive. The
credible pain group (M = 10.51, SD = 2.28) and control M-STBI group (M = 10.23, SD = 2.25)
scored significantly higher than the malingering group (M = 7.20, SD = 2.95). They reported
37% sensitivity and 92% specificity with a 65% positive predictive power at a 20% base rate for
Reliable Digits < 7. They further reported that scores of < 6 in M-STBI were associated with
99% specificity.
Heinly, Greve, Bianchini, Love, and Brennan (2005) reported Reliable Digits mean
values for clinic data from their mixed group of TBI patients with mild to severe injury. Those
patients with no incentive to feign (M = 9.91, SD = 2.30), non-MND patients with only incentive
to malinger (M = 9.93, SD = 2.30), and suspected malingerers (M = 8.32, SD = 2.03) scored
higher than probable malingerers (M = 7.15, SD = 2.02) and those meeting Slick Criteria for
definite MND (M = 6.61, SD = 2.23). While sensitivity was low at 39%, specificity (96%) was
excellent for Reliable Digits < 6 in comparing the total TBI group with those TBI patients
determined to be malingerers. They also indicated that, in a 20% base rate condition, a score of <
6 was associated with a 71% positive predictive validity (p. 441). Using their classification
scheme, across all credible TBI patients, none scored lower than 6 on Reliable Digits (100%
specificity). However, they also reported that a score of < 5 was associated with more false
positives in patients who were elderly, had endured a cerebrovascular accident (14% false
positives), had substantiated severe memory disorders (18% false positives), were diagnosed
with a psychiatric condition (2% false positives), or had a diagnosis other than TBI (12% false
positives). They also held that a score of < 5 was associated with a 56% positive predictive
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validity with holding specificity to 95% in a 20% base rate condition in the credible TBI sample.
Based on their findings, in conjunction with additional literature, they recommended that
Reliable Digits < 7 is consistent with a negative response bias.
In another study Bianchini, Love, Greve, and Adams (2005) studied an archive of 11
patients referred for neuropsychological evaluation, 10 of who were involved in workers’
compensation litigation. Nine of the patients met Slick Criteria for either probable or definite
malingering. Using Reliable Digits < 6, neither of the two credible patients were misclassified,
while 5 of the nine malingerers were correctly identified. When using Reliable Digits < 7, one
(25%) of the credible was misclassified, and six of the nine (66%) malingerers were correctly
identified.
Babikian et al. (2006) showed their noncredible performance group (based on Slick
Criteria) scored low on Reliable Digits (M = 6.7, SD = 2.4) with the clinical (M = 8.9, SD = 2.0)
and non-clinical controls (M = 9.28, SD = 1.61) scoring higher. Investigation of Reliable Digits
of < 7 resulted in high 62% sensitivity and poor specificity (77% for clinical patients, 87% for
controls). When lowered to < 6, sensitivity (45%) fell, but specificity (93%) was raised. This
resulted in a 53% positive predictive power in a 15% base rate condition.
Axelrod, Fichtenberg, Millis, and Wertheimer (2006) included Reliable Digits among
several other validity measures. Archival data were analyzed from patients with documented TBI
(n = 29), patients involved in litigation who met Slick Criteria (n = 36), and a MTBI control
group (n = 22). Presentation of means for the groups indicated the malingering group (M = 6.3,
SD = 2.1) performed significantly lower than the TBI (M = 8.5, SD = 2.1) and MTBI (M = 9.7,
SD = 2.7) groups. Their study did not include classification rates for Reliable Digits.
Greve et al. (2007) reported that those meeting Slick Criteria (M = 7.37, SD = 2.25)
scored lower than both an indeterminate group (M = 8.10, SD = 1.55) and clinical controls (M =
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9.47, SD = 1.74). Specificity of Reliable Digits < 7 was 89% with a sensitivity of 54%, while
lowering the cutoff to < 6 altered the specificity to 97% and lowered sensitivity to 46%.
However, positive predictive power was high (79%) at a 20% base rate. Thus, Greve et al. (2007)
suggested that a score of < 7 in the presence of objective brain pathology is an equivocal
indicator of malingering.
In Graue et al.’s (2007) sample of feigned mental retardation, the community control
group with low average intellectual functioning (M = 8.1, SD = 2.0) performed higher than the
mental retardation simulation group (M = 5.9, SD = 1.7), which performed similarly to those
diagnosed with mental retardation (M = 5.5, SD = 1.6). Classification accuracy between the
simulated mental retardation group versus the community mental retardation group was poor
using a cutoff of < 6 (56% sensitivity, 15% specificity). Marshall and Happe (2007) also reported
failure rates of Reliable Digits < 7 in a sample of 100 individuals diagnosed with mental
retardation (FSIQ M = 63, ranging from 51 to 74) having no obvious incentive to feign
impairment. As a whole, the group scored below the Greiffenstein et al. (1994) cutscore
(M = 5.8, SD = 1.7). Accordingly, they indicated a high false positive rate (69%) in that group,
suggesting that this method of malingering detection is at best questionable when used with
intellectually disabled clients. Dean et al. (2007) also reported high failure rates (33%
specificity) of Reliable Digits < 6 in patients with FSIQ ranging from 50-69 (in the intellectually
disabled range). However, fewer patients with IQ’s ranging from 70-79 were misidentified (81%
specificity).
In addition to clinical studies, experimental designs have also been used to investigate the
utility of Reliable Digits. Strauss et al. (2002) used an experimental design to assign 74
community recruited adults into one of three groups. The first group consisted of 27 individuals
with a history of documented head injury (19 MTBI, 8 M-STBI), a naïve group (n = 26)
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containing individuals without head injury history and had no professional contact with head
injured individuals, an experienced group of patients with no history of head injury but did have
professional contact with individuals who had experienced a head injury. Each participant was
then assigned to one of two experimental conditions: 1) simulated malingering or 2) control
condition. To investigate variability of performance across repeated administrations of Reliable
Digits and other malingering instruments, all participants were tested on three occasions. They
indicated that performance on Reliable Digits over testing trials was variable. They also
replicated the finding that Reliable Digits performance was lower in experimental malingerers
than controls, and this finding was robust regardless of the level of prior knowledge and
experience with head injury. Mean Reliable Digits performance for the first testing session per
group in the control condition ranged from 10.25 to 11.77 (SD = 2.93-2.20), while average
malingered performance ranged from 5.60 to 6.46 (SD = 2.57-4.06). Classification accuracy for
the use of Reliable Digits to correctly identify control participants was 90% and accuracy for the
identified malingering participants was 79.4%. Thus, the sensitivity (47%) was poor, but
specificity was high (95%) for Reliable Digits < 6.
In another experimental study, Etherton, Bianchini, Ciota, and Greve (2005), assigned
participants to one of three conditions: controls (n = 20), those instructed to simulate memory
impairment (n = 20), and participants completed Reliable Digits while experiencing laboratoryinduced pain (n = 20). Performance on Reliable Digits was significantly better for controls (M =
10.65, SD = 2.33) and in the laboratory pain condition (M = 10.25, SD = 1.62) than for the
simulation group (M = 6.25, SD = 2.73). They reported that Reliable Digits < 7 resulted in 65%
sensitivity and 100% specificity and Reliable Digits < 9 was associated with 80% sensitivity and
specificity. The high specificity in this group likely reflects the high level of education of their
university sample.
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Digit Span Forward and Digit Span Backward. In the Digit Span task of the WAISIII/WMS-III, the participant repeats the orally presented stimuli sequentially from the first
number presented to the last. As the task progresses, each successive two-item trial is extended
by a single digit. For example, the items are first trial of two digits in length, while the second
trial is composed of items three digits long, and each trial increases sequentially. The total Digit
Span forward equals the sum of the number of correctly completed trials. The test is discontinued
when the participant misses both items of any given trial and the trial length before discontinuing
represents the maximum digits span (forward). The methodology is the same for the backward
span task, expect that the participant is required to repeat the digits in reverse sequential order.
Thus, participants also obtain scores for the number of correct trials (Digit Span backward) and
longest string of digits they are able to repeat (maximum attentional span backward). Research
has consistently shown that participants instructed to malinger display a shortened attention span
for repeating numbers sequentially (Iverson & Franzen, 1994, 1996; Vickery et al., 2004) and
others have shown the same pattern in known noncredible patients (Babikian et al., 2006; Binder
& Willis, 1991; Suhr et al., 1997). Iverson and Tulsky (2003) have reported normative
performance of maximum attentional span forward and maximum attentional span backward
performance and indicated that a maximum attentional span forward < 4 and maximum
attentional span backward < 2 is rare in the general population. Heinly et al. (2005) and Babikian
et al. (2006) also reported that maximum attentional span forward < 4 rarely occurs except for
those with known MND. However, while the occurrence for maximum attentional span
backward < 2 was rare in those shown not to be malingering, the rate was considerable among
those with a documented cerebrovascular accident and memory problems. This later observation
likely reflects the assertion that backward digit span tasks require working memory resources,
which are often affected by those conditions (Reynolds, 1997). Despite the aforementioned
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research with forward and backward spans, they are among the least studied measures in
research order to establish optimal cutscores.
Difference Score Approaches
Researchers have also examined feigning behavior based on current knowledge of brain
functioning. This has led to exploring improbable test patterns to identify malingering. For
example, recognition memory is generally superior to free-recall memory. Based on that
knowledge, a series of early studies addressed discrepancy of patients’ performance on
recognition versus recall (Bernard, McGrath, & Houston, 1993) and some have also examined
discrepancy between attention/concentration and general memory performance (Hilsabeck et al.,
2003; Iverson, Slick, & Franzen, 2000; Mittenberg et al., 1993; Slick, Hinkin, van Gorp, & Satz,
2001). Other discrepancies consist of examining domains of brain functioning that have been
shown to remain robust following cerebral insult, such as crystallized verbal knowledge and digit
span, with indices known to be vulnerable to disruption. This approach was first introduced by
Wechsler (1955) in the hold-don’t hold comparisons in the original WAIS.
Vocabulary Minus Digit Span. Mittenberg et al. (1995) first examined discrepancies
between WAIS-R measures of verbal knowledge and Digit Span performance. This procedure
involves subtracting the digit span age-corrected scaled scores from the scaled score of the
Vocabulary subtest, which results in the Vocabulary minus Digit Span index. In the 1995 study,
they compared 67 nonlitigating head injured patients to a group of adult volunteers instructed to
malinger (n = 67) on the WAIS-R, and reported their findings in terms of Vocabulary minus
Digits scores and associated malingering probability values. They showed that a Vocabulary
minus Digits Span of 1.53 optimally differentiated the groups, which resulted in 70% sensitivity.
However, they failed to report false positive rates for the control participants. Since that study,
others have suggested using cutscores of two (> +2) (Demakis, 2004; Millis, Ross, & Ricker,
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1998). Larger discrepancies have been associated with higher levels of diagnostic accuracy in
identifying noncredible performance, and WAIS-III Vocabulary minus Digits discrepancy scores
where the base rate for malingering is 20% vary accordingly (Vocabulary minus Digits = 2, 50%
accuracy; Vocabulary minus Digits = 3, 68% accuracy; Vocabulary minus Digits = 4, 79%
accuracy) in differentiating malingered performance (Mittenberg et al., 2001). That finding was
also echoed by Greve, Bianchini, Mathais, Houston, and Crouch’s (2003) report that a
Vocabulary minus Digits > 4 was associated with the highest specificity (77% to 100%), but
lowest sensitivity (0% to 50% ) in relation to cutscores of two or three. Additionally, the rates of
Vocabulary minus Digits > 2 in clinical groups applying for vocational assistance or disability is
near 30% (close to the hypothetical base rate; Williams & Carlin, 1999).
Despite the relatively good performance of Vocabulary minus Digits in differentiating
malingering, there have been caveats issued by other research. For example, Axelrod and
Rawlings (1999) studied archival data of three samples of cognitive rehabilitation patients with a
documented significant TBI across multiple assessments throughout their recovery process.
Using Vocabulary minus Digits > 2, they noted specificities of 70% in all three groups at two
months post injury. Specificity increased to 79%, 86%, and 91% in each group at a year status
post injury. This suggests that performance on Vocabulary minus Digits, as a validity test, may
not be appropriate for individuals in acute recovery stages of a TBI. Marshall and Happe (2007)
also reported that Vocabulary minus Digits is likely insensitive to invalid performance in a
mental retardation population as their sample of intellectually disabled patients had a mean score
of -1.03 and only two of 100 patients scored below a discrepancy of greater than two. Graue et
al. (2007) also reported that the average individual diagnosed with mental retardation has a
negative Vocabulary minus Digits, while those malingering mental retardation only have slightly
positive scores. This resulted in very poor sensitivity (0%) and perfect specificity. Taken
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together, those results suggest that Vocabulary minus Digits in low IQ groups is not vulnerable
to malingering. However, this may be due to the fact that those with lowered intellectual
functioning tend to demonstrate overall lowered cognitive abilities. Thus, large discrepancies
between cognitive abilities are less likely to occur in those with intellectual disabilities as
performance is typically uniformly lowered.
Iverson and Tulsky (2003) further reported that difference scores (either positive or
negative) of greater than or equal to five occur in fewer than 5% (2.5% for > +5) of the WAIS-III
standardization sample. They also found that difference scores of 2 or more occur in 13.6% of
the TBI group reported in the manual and 6.9% of the total clinical patients. In young persons
(ages 16-34), 20.9% have difference scores of > 3, resulting in approximately 10% having
positive values (Vocabulary minus Digits > +3). They also reported that approximately half of
the patients and clinical groups had a higher Digit Span score relative to Vocabulary. In general
then, approximately 6.9% of patients in clinical groups have scores of > 4, and 13.8% have
values > 3. Across all age groups, nearly 20.5% have Vocabulary minus Digits > 3 (Vocabulary
minus Digits > +3). Moreover, Mittenberg et al. (2001) also reported the Vocabulary minus
Digits of 2, 3, and 4 resulted in correctly classifying 73.9, 82.9, and 89.8% of the WAIS-III
standardization sample respectively. Another report by Miller, Ryan, Carruthers, and Cluff
(2004) indicated 99% specificity for Vocabulary minus Digits > 6 in a mixed credible clinical
sample. Therefore, a cutscore of > 3 should result in adequate specificity in the general
population and in most clinical settings where there is little evidence for marked neurological
problems
Discriminant Functions
Mittenberg’s Discriminant Function Score (Mittenberg Index). By applying multivariate
techniques, Mittenberg, Theroux-Fichera, Zielinski, and Heilbronner (1995) differentiated
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groups of simulated malingerers and nonlitigating patients according to performance pattern
across WAIS-R subtests. Their procedure resulted in a widely used and cited classification
discriminant function score (Mittenberg Index). They reported the following equation: Digit
Span (-.3289) + Vocabulary (.1715) + Arithmetic (-.0720) + Comprehension (-.0811) +
Similarities (.1580) + Picture Completion (-.0799) + Digit Symbol Coding (.0780) + .9696
(Constant). By using that combination of subtest scaled scores and derived coefficients, they
reported that a Mittenberg Index value of > .00 resulted in 50% probability of malingering with
the probability increasing as the value of the Mittenberg Index increases. Using the Mittenberg
Index, they were able to obtain a 76% true positive rate. Further cross-validation work of the
Mittenberg Index in a known malingering group and credible TBI sample showed a Mittenberg
Index cutoff of .10536 resulted in high classification accuracy for both the TBI (92%) and
malingering (88%) groups (Millis et al., 1998).
Their technique has also been further cross-validated on clinical groups using the WAISIII. Mittenberg et al. (2001) reported a sensitivity of 72.2% (for simulating malingerers) and
83.3% specificity for a cutoff of > .00 as recommended by Mittenberg et al. (1995). The
sensitivity for probable malingerers in a clinical sample was low (44.4%). Classification
accuracy rates according to a 20% base rate across groups were reported for Mittenberg Index
cutoff scores of .00 (51%), .10 (55%), and .20 (62%). Overall, their cross-validation supported
use of the formula for extended application of the Mittenberg Index to the WAIS-III.
Greve et al. (2003) further applied the Mittenberg Index to classify malingering patients.
However, their findings suggested that Mittenberg Index > .00 resulted in poor specificity (80%),
but was increased when the cutoff was raised to > .212 (92% to 100% for the WAIS-III). That
more conservative cutoff resulted in adequate sensitivity (57% for the WAIS-III). In general,
they found a higher false positive rate in their S-MTBI group than the MTBI group, suggesting
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the Mittenberg Index is somewhat sensitive to injury severity. However, no credible patient with
MTBI was misclassified as a malingerer based on Mittenberg Index > .00, indicating that value
may be appropriate for patients claiming less severe cerebral impairment (as in MTBI). Their
calculations indicated that the positive predictive power for Mittenberg Index > .00 was 44% and
negative predictive power was 88%. However, Bianchini et al. (2005) also applied the
Mittenberg Index to their small sample of patients claiming neurocognitive dysfunction from
electric injury. Inspection of their classification indicated a sensitivity of 67% and perfect
specificity for a Mittenberg Index > .00.
However, there may be clinical situations where use of Mittenberg Index > .00 is
inappropriate. Axelrod and Rawlings (1999) reported that the acute recovery phase of
rehabilitation patients may be one such instance as specificity ranged from 76% to 78% at two
months post TBI. Nevertheless, this high false positive rate declined substantially following a
year after injury with specificity ranging from 88% to 93%. In their analysis of patients
diagnosed with mental retardation, Graue et al. (2007) reported the average Mittenberg Index
was .04 (SD = .74), thus sensitivity (48%) and specificity (65%) were not optimal. In all, positive
findings from Mittenberg Index may be more commonly found in cases of documented severe
impairment in those experiencing acute TBI recovery and in cases with bonafide developmental
disabilities. Therefore, cutscores should be modified based on the clinical population (> .212 for
S-MTBI, .00-.10 for MTBI patients and groups with no suspected neurological injury).
Rarely Missed Index. Poor recognition memory is often associated with profile invalidity
(Constantinou, Bauer, Ashendorf, Fisher, & McCaffrey, 2005) and not significantly related to
MTBI or M-STBI (Fisher, Ledbetter, Cohen, Marmor, & Tulsky, 2000). To capitalize on that
observation, researchers have recently attempted to quantify the relationship between poor
recognition performance and atypical performance on the WMS-III. After noting unusual
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response bias patterns on the Logical Memory Delayed Recognition portion of the WMS-III
(Killgore & DellaPietra, 2000a), Killgore and DellaPietra (2000b) further investigated items of
that subtest that differentiated college students instructed to feign memory impairment from an
archival review of credible neurological patients with memory impairment.
Using a discriminant function analysis, they determined that raw scores on the
dichotomous items (yes or no) 12, 16, 18, 22, 24, and 29 were rarely failed (p < .05) in naïve
control participants and patients. Their derived equation, the Rarely Missed Index, separated the
groups with a high degree of accuracy. The resultant equation is as follows: item 12(-22) + item
16(55) + item 18(84) + item 22(67) + item 24(13) + item 29(7), and ranges from -22 to 226.
Lower scores on the Rarely Missed Index were more associated with invalid performance and a
cutoff score of < 136 accurately identified 99% of the simulated malingerers. That score also
resulted in a 100% specificity across base rates ranging from 1% to 50% with sensitivity
remaining high (87%) in the lowest base rate condition.
Since that initial study, Langeluddecke and Lucas (2004) further supported the use of the
Rarely Missed Index in an archival clinical sample of 99 consecutive referrals with MTBI.
Almost half (46%) were plaintiff referrals and the rest were referrals from defense attorneys. Of
that sample 28 patients met Slick Criteria and were compared to the remainder of the control
sample according to the Rarely Missed Index. Given the groups’ similarities (all were in
litigation), the specificity (75%) of the Rarely Missed Index was poorer in their study with 100%
specificity for cutoff scores < 40. However, at that substantially lower cut-off point, sensitivity
was very low.
In contrast, Miller, Ryan, Carruthers, and Cluff (2004) reported a 95% specificity for the
original cutoff score in an archival sample of mixed, nonlitigating credible patients (n = 100)
composed of various diagnostic groups (Alcohol Abuse, Polysubstance Abuse, and TBI). Two of
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their false positive cases had been diagnosed with TBI had FSIQ scores of 81 and 91, and also
had impaired memory performance. Another misidentified case also had low average memory
performance. Two other false positive patients showed Vocabulary minus Digits > 3. Thus, at
least two of the false positive cases likely showed severe memory impairment, another had low
memory functioning, and two others displayed questionable performance based on an external
measure. This suggests that the participants misidentified by the Rarely Missed Index were
actually questionable false positives. There is also recent evidence to suggest that the Rarely
Missed Index may be appropriate to use in those diagnosed with mental retardation as it has only
a 9% false positive rate in that population (Marshall & Happe, 2007).
Other Memory Indicators
Langeluddecke and Lucas (2003) demonstrated that low performance on the Auditory
Recognition-Delayed subtest from the WMS-III was sensitive to malingering in an archival
sample of TBI participants. They subdivided their sample into a credible (n = 50) and
malingering (n = 25) group based on the Slick Criteria. They then selected the lowest score
obtained by the credible group as the criterion for group comparison (Auditory RecognitionDelayed raw score < 43). This procedure resulted in 80% sensitivity and 91.8% specificity for
the Auditory Recognition-Delayed cutoff score. Ord, Greve, and Bianchini (2007) also supported
using cutoff scores based on the Auditory Recognition-Delayed standard scores < 75. This cutoff
also happens to correspond with Langeluddecke and Lucas (2003), with an Auditory
Recognition-Delayed raw score < 43 for those ages 16-54 years (Wechsler, 1997b). They
reported 94% specificity and 68% sensitivity with that indicator based on differentiating a known
group of MTBI patients meeting Slick Criteria from those not meeting Slick Criteria. However,
that specificity level dropped for patients with M-STBI and history of a cerebrovascular accident
(89%) and dementia (73%). Conceptually, those findings are buttressed by findings that the
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Auditory Recognition-Delayed subtest scores are not significantly lowered in MTBI and SMTBI when compared to normal control participants (Fisher et al., 2000). Langeluddecke and
Lucas (2003) further reported that the Logical Memory Delayed Recognition subtest (< 19) and
Word Lists Delayed subtests (< 18) performed with similar specificity (91.7% and 96.6%,
respectively), but differed in their sensitivity (48% and 81%, respectively).
Langeluddecke and Lucas (2003) also utilized the same method for the Faces I subtest
(cutoff < 24), which resulted in 32% sensitivity and 96% specificity. This was supported by
Glassmire et al.’s (2003) findings from a simulation experiment with nonmalingering M-STBI (n
= 35) patients and participants with no history of neurological compromise (n = 30). Participants
instructed to malingerer were compared on the Faces I subtest and found the cutoff of < 24
resulted in 100% specificity, but low sensitivity (33% to 63%).
In addition to reported cutoff scores for Auditory Recognition-Delayed, Ord et al. (2007)
also published several classification rates of other standard index scores from the WMS-III.
Those index scores associated with > 90% specificity include the Auditory Immediate (< 80),
Visual Immediate (< 80), Immediate Memory (< 75), Auditory Delayed (< 75), Visual Delayed
(< 85), General Memory (< 80), and Working Memory (< 80) Indices. However, several of those
cutscores are likely not appropriate for use with those diagnosed with neurological complications
secondary to a cerebrovascular accident, dementia, or M-STBI as they result in a high false
positive rate. To further investigate their classification system, they conducted a logistic
regression using several of the indices as predictor variables and designating malingering status
as the outcome variable. The resultant equation is as follows: Auditory Immediate(.0120) +
Visual Immediate(-.0188) + Auditory Delayed(.0058) + Visual Delayed(-.0241) + Auditory
Recognition-Delayed(.0001) + Working Memory(-.1169) + 10.890. From their equation, scores
> -1.0 have a 68% sensitivity and 91% specificity, with an associated likelihood ratio of 7.6,
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whereas scores of > -.5 are associated with 65% sensitivity and 97% specificity with a likelihood
ratio of 21.7. Despite the well-performing equation, they recommended that clinicians identify
noncredible performance by examining clients who score < 75 points on three or more of those
indices to avoid false positives. Thus, their approach appears quite robust and performed well in
their sample. This is especially the case given their groups were based on the Slick Criteria and
each group had a similar level of injury and most of credible patients also had incentive to
perform poorly.
Working Memory and Processing Speed
Although cognitive processing speed and working memory are among the most sensitive
brain functions to cerebral insult (Fisher et al., 2000), measures of those faculties have also been
shown to be sensitive to noncredible performance. Several subtests from the WAIS-III/WMS-III
assess those abilities including Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Arithmetic, DigitSymbol Coding, Spatial Span, and Symbol Search. Across several studies of malingering
employing both experimental and clinical malingering groups, researchers have reported
significantly lower performance in malingering participants than nonmalingering participants. In
particular, performance on Digit-Symbol Coding has repeatedly been low in malingering groups
(Orey et al., 2000; Trueblood, 1994; Trueblood & Schmidt, 1993; Vickery et al., 2004;
Youngjohn et al., 1995); however, that finding has not been universal (Rawling & Brooks,
1990).
In one of the earliest classification studies using thinking speed measures as markers for
noncredibility, Trueblood (1994) reported a Digit-Symbol Coding scaled score of less than five
(WAIS-R) was associated with 36% sensitivity and 100% specificity. Since then, others have
reported low processing speed scores in patients displaying malingered pain behavior (Etherton,
Bianchini, Heinly et al., 2006). Etherton et al. (2006) reported that those meeting Slick Criteria
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for definite MND (M = 71.25, SD = 10.17) performed significantly lower on the WAIS-III
Processing Speed Index than those with memory disorders (M = 83.24, SD = 12.82), M-STBI (M
= 84.74, SD = 14.89), and control participants (M = 89.48, SD = 10.17). Although the
noncredible group, as a whole, performed in the borderline impaired range of functioning,
classification statistics from those data still revealed that a Processing Speed Index score of < 70
had good sensitivity (63%) and borderline specificity (89%) in a mixed clinical sample (n = 121)
containing TBI, pain, and patients with memory disorder. However, this approach to detecting
invalid protocols is not likely indicated for use with those diagnosed with low cognitive
functioning as in those with intellectual disabilities (Marshall & Happe, 2007). However, in
samples with less significant cognitive dysfunction, that score would likely be appropriate and
result in few false positives.
As reported above, the WMS-III Working Memory Index has also been shown to
accurately classify those meeting Slick Criteria. Early reports of low WMS-III Working Memory
Index scores among malingerers indicated that known probable malingerers scored nearly 18
standard score points (1.25 standard deviations) below control participants (Mathias et al., 2002).
Lange et al. (2006) also reported that a clinical group meeting Slick Criteria performed nearly
one standard deviation below a nonmalingering clinical control group on the WMS-III Working
Memory Index. In accordance with this general finding, Ord et al. (2007) reported adequate
classification rates for using the WMS-III Working Memory Index (< 80) (94% specificity and
68% sensitivity). Moreover, Etherton, Bianchini, Ciota, Heinly, and Greve (2006) reported a
WAIS-III Working Memory Index < 70 resulted in specificity ranging from 93% to 96% with
sensitivity of 47% in a sample of MND pain patients.
As a whole, the overwhelming focus on MND research has pertained to those seeking
financial awards as the substantial incentive to perform poorly related to compensation for
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alleged disability status caused by identifiable external factors. This is particularly the case
concerning the use of the WAIS-III and WMS-III in detecting noncredible performance.
Moreover, that research has largely pertained to comparing patients claiming significant brain
injuries to patients with substantiated brain injury known to cause a number of functional
impairments or comparison with patients determined to be malingering. In this regard, several of
the aforementioned derived WAIS-III/WMS-III indices have been validated to discriminate
patients exaggerating neurocognitive dysfunction.
However, feigning poor psychological test performance or exaggerating symptoms in
order to establish disability status related to less severe neurocognitive dysfunction also occurs to
obtain other external gains (not necessarily monetary) and pertains to those with alleged
congenital neurocognitive problems. Nevertheless, very little research on noncredible test
performance has been conducted with samples seeking other forms of external relief to
accommodate or relieve disadvantages associated with neurocognitive problems less dramatic
than TBI. For example, research into noncredible performance in those with disorders of isolated
neurocognitive deficits such as specific learning disorders (LD) or Attention-Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) has been largely neglected. In such cases, there is no party
responsible for neurocognitive deficits that are typically diagnosed early in the developmental
lifespan. Hence, the problems evade the attention of the legal system as there are not typically
large monetary sums at stake for obtaining associated disability status. Be this as it may, there
are other tangible external incentives available as a function of being diagnosed with a less
severe neurocognitive disorders such as ADHD or LD.
External Incentives in Educational Settings
There are numerous conditions (physical and mental), which might place students at a
disadvantage when performing scholastically, resulting in high rates of poor academic
48

performance, grade retention, and dropping out (U.S. Department of Education, 2005). In order
to address such disadvantages and potential discrimination against affected individuals within
that class, governmental authorities have drafted legislation and adopted regulations to mitigate
disabling functional effects of numerous health and/or social conditions. This is particularly
relevant in the university setting as there has been a significant rise in the number of adults and
post-secondary students complaining of cognitive problems and seeking disability status
(Nichols, Harrison, McCloskey, & Weintraub, 2002). In fact, the number of individuals between
the ages of three and 21 receiving support from federally funded educational programs for the
disabled has nearly doubled within the past 20 years to over 6.7 million, and 1.7 million (8.7%)
post-secondary students were considered disabled in 2000 (U.S. Department of Education,
2005).
While deficits negatively impacting scholastic performance can occur from functional
limitations caused by a number of physical disabilities, they can also be attributed to a host of
emotional, psychological, and/or cognitive disorders. For instance, those diagnosed with
cognitive problems (e.g., ADHD, LD) often have functional deficits in thinking skills that
negatively impact their ability to perform academic tasks. Therefore, educational institutions
have formed policies and procedures in accordance with governmental statutes (e.g.,
Rehabilitation Act of 1973) to provide an accommodating environment for those with disabling
conditions that result in specific functional deficits affecting academic performance.
A typical component of such procedures entails providing an academic environment
tailored to individual student needs. This often includes providing the student with extra time on
exams and assignments, taking tests in special settings (i.e., a quiet room), providing alternative
response formats on exams (i.e., marking multiple choices on the test form rather than a Scantron
response sheet), provision for note-takers, or offering other allowances (Evans, Serpell, Schultz,
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& Pastor, 2007; Hadley, 2007). While such accommodations are available for eligible students
through educational institutions, they are also offered to qualifying individuals taking important
examinations that serve educational, organizational, and societal gait-keeping functions (such as
the Scholastic Assessment Test, American College Test, Graduate Record Examination, or
professional certification or qualifying exams). Due to the importance of such exams and the
allure of academic success, accommodations in this regard may appear desirable to any student
who has pressure to perform well, which provides an external incentive to seek disability status.
Another area of external incentive for those seeking to compensate for cognitive
disabilities is obtaining medications that have been marketed to ameliorate cognitive deficits or
improve cognitive functioning (i.e., amphetamines), especially for those with attentional
dysfunction (Pary et al., 2002; Peterson, McDonagh, & Rongwei, 2008). In fact, prescription of
amphetamine based psychostimulant medications (dextroamphetamine/racemic [Adderral],
methylphenidate [Ritalin, Methylin, Concerta]) for attentional disorders (ADHD) has increased
to high levels for students with documented attentional problems (McCabe, Teter, Boyd, &
Guthrie, 2004). So too, non-prescription and non-medical adoption of such drugs have risen in
normative student populations with increased levels of seeking and selling prescription
medications for enhanced studying or recreational purposes. In fact, researchers have reported
high rates of students either knowing someone who was prescribed a stimulant; or had
personally taken and/or sold one themselves (Advokat, Guidry, & Martino, 2008; Babcock &
Byme, 2000; McCabe, Teter, & Boyd, 2006; White, Becker-Blease, & Grace-Bishop, 2006).
Moreover, thirty-four percent of college students prescribed a medication for ADHD reported
being solicited for their medication (Moline & Frankenberger, 2001) and this trend has been
satirized by popular media (Parker, 2000) as well. Therefore, university students may have
compelling external reasons for seeking a disability status related to attentional problems in order
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to obtain stimulant medication because they expect the use of stimulant medication will improve
academic performance and for recreational purposes.
Thus, the potential for external gain secondary in being diagnosed with a disabling
cognitive condition in the student population is a factor to consider when evaluating the nature
and extent of attentional and learning complaints. This is particularly relevant as such disorders
are often evaluated by psychologists (Crank & Deshler, 2001) employing measures with
embedded indices shown to be sensitive to response bias and effort (see above). Despite this set
of issues, there are currently no established measures available that have been validated to assess
feigned deficits in ADHD assessment, and there is only one recently devised preliminary
experimental measure to investigate effort in LD assessments (Osmon et al., 2006).
Of the few studies that have examined this matter in students seeking evaluation, most
have employed simulation designs and/or have used small samples. For instance, Quinn (2003)
showed that simulators of ADHD produced higher rates of attentional complaints and diagnostic
symptoms of ADHD on self-report measures than controls or those diagnosed with ADHD. She
also reported that the simulated ADHD group performed substantially lower on cognitive testing
than both the control and clinical samples. Thus, her pioneering study revealed that test
performance characteristics of ADHD can indeed be feigned through experimental manipulation.
Other case reports in this area have also appeared in the literature and have suggested that
malingered ADHD may be associated with behavioral problems (Conti, 2004).
More recently, Harrison, Edwards, and Parker (2007) examined the effects of instructions
to feign ADHD symptoms and performance on self-report symptom inventories and measures of
thinking speed. Similar to other simulation studies, they reported that their feigning group
reported more symptoms than controls and a criterion clinical ADHD group. The feigning group
also performed much lower on measures of thinking speed than the ADHD group and control
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participants. Thus, instruments typically employed in an ADHD evaluation are sensitive to
feigned poor performance and symptom exaggeration. Other simulation and clinical research has
also shown that measures of thinking speed and attentional focus may be susceptible to feigned
poor performance in typical neuropsychological evaluations (Henry, 2005; Leark, Dixon,
Hoffman, & Huynh, 2002; Lu, Boone, Jimenez, & Razani, 2004; Willison & Tombaugh, 2006).
In the only published account of effort specific to LD assessment, Osmon et al. (2006)
reported preliminary validation of a specialized assessment measure. In their simulation study,
college participants (N = 84) were assigned to one of three conditions: 1) Reading Disorder
simulation, 2) slow thinking speed simulation, and 3) normal effort. As part of the procedures,
participants were administered the Word Memory Test (Green, 2003), the researchers’ newly
constructed Word Reading Test, and an estimation of intellectual functioning. The Word
Reading Test is a computerized task developed to mimic lay persons’ conception of reading
disorders and dyslexic conditions. For instance, participants are briefly shown a word and
subsequently shown two more words simultaneously – one of which is the initially presented
target word (e.g., develop) and another word (e.g., bevelop) that may be attributable to reading
problems (p. 316). Upon presentation of the two simultaneously presented items, the participant
is required to choose the target item presented previously. Participants’ performance on the task
is assessed across multiple trials. Their rationale for devising this type of task was that
individuals feigning reading problems will commonly err by choosing the non-word at a higher
rate than those with diagnosed reading problems.
Their results supported that hypothesis, indicating appropriate usage of the Word Reading
Test for detecting poor performance in reading disorder evaluations. They also reported that the
Word Memory Test, a symptom validity test, classified simulating participants at an acceptable
rate, indicating that traditional validity measures may be appropriate for this purpose. While the
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Osmon et al. (2006) study represents the first and only published account of LD simulation, the
results have yet to be replicated and extended to a clinical sample. Moreover, specialized
measures, such as the Word Reading Test, are not available for clinical use, limiting the
applicability of their findings. Relevant to LD assessment, though, poor Word Memory
Performance was significantly associated with decreased performance on some memory and
intelligence measures.
In a study of 67 consecutive referrals to a university-based psychological assessment
clinic, Sullivan, May, and Galally (2007) investigated potential symptom exaggeration of
students complaining of either ADHD and/or LD. They reported that 15 (22.4%) of the clients
demonstrated failure on at least one index from the Word Memory Test, a validated measure of
effortful responding. They also partially replicated inverse relationships between Word Memory
Test performance and intellectual functioning in those failing the Word Memory Test. An
inverse relationship was also demonstrated in clients who failed the Word Memory Test and the
California Verbal Learning Test–Second Edition.
Although that study demonstrated a high failure rate on a symptom validity test and
showed small to moderate positive relationships with objective cognitive measures, the authors
may not have adequately addressed a few issues in the sample. First, they implied that the clients
had external incentive for seeking the evaluation, but did not indicate this through formal means,
simply indicating that the potential for secondary gains (i.e., accommodation-seeking or
medication-seeking) in the sample was “operant” (B. Sullivan, personal communication, April
24, 2008). They also did not address the presence of pre-existing learning problems or attentional
difficulties due to the lack of criterion control and questionable integrity of prior diagnoses.
Moreover, the relationship between Word Memory Test performance and the cognitive measures
was based solely on clients scoring below cutscores indicative of invalid performance, possibly
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inflating the relationship. However, the authors only examined composite IQ scores, which likely
masked the relationships of Word Memory performance and specific intellectual abilities (e.g.,
cognitive processing speed). Yet another weakness in the study is that only one measure of
validity was evaluated, limiting the applicability of the findings to other established measures,
and especially embedded indices. Lastly, the study lacked a control sample against which to
compare the elevated failure rates of the clinical sample.
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Purpose and Rationale
Reports of high failure rates on validity indices has only very recently been noted in
college samples seeking psychoeducational evaluation but standard research or clinical criteria
for noncredible performance (i.e., Slick Criteria) have yet to be applied in such samples. While
Sullivan et al. (2007) reported evidence of high failure rates in this population, their lack of
reporting potential for explicit external gains limits the application of the Slick Criteria to their
sample. Thus, reasons for the lowered performance could be due to factors other than
malingering as outlined in the Slick Criteria (Delis & Wetter, 2007). As such, the question of
overt medication-seeking and/or academic accommodation seeking status has not been
investigated for its possible relationship with performance on neuropsychological tests, nor to
validity measures embedded therein. The focus of this project was to address some of those
concerns.
Validity indices for the WAIS-III/WMS-III have received considerable attention and
have been examined in simulated malingering groups, various patient groups (litigating, TBI,
pain, etc.), and control participants. Nevertheless, the aforementioned validation studies often
have employed small to moderate sample sizes and none have attempted to investigate
simultaneously several validity indices from both the WAIS-III and WMS-III in the same study,
even in small samples. Additionally, a thorough literature review failed to uncover published
work reporting the wide range of WAIS-III/WMS-III indices in a university sample. This is a
serious concern given the WAIS-III and WMS-III are the neuropsychological instruments most
likely to have influence, not only into the clinic and courtroom, but in the academic setting as
well.
Questions and Hypotheses
The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the following questions:
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Question 1
Is overt academic accommodation and/or stimulant medication seeking associated with
performance on intelligence and memory tests?
Hypothesis 1. In keeping with findings that performance on neuropsychological tests
is often feigned in those seeking other forms of external gain, it is expected that those overtly
seeking recommendations for academic accommodations and/or stimulant medications (External
Incentive) will show significantly lower performance on those measures when compared to a
normal control group (Control) and a clinical group comprised of clients not overtly expressing
interest in receiving such external incentives (No External Incentive). More specially, the author
expects to find particularly lower performance on measures requiring thinking speed and
attention (e.g., Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Symbol Search, Digit-Symbol Coding) in
the External Incentive group as those symptoms have been shown to be among the most sensitive
to noncredible performance.
Question 2
Do those seeking psychoeducational evaluations for overt external incentives differ from
those not overly seeking external incentives and control participants according to validity indices
from the WAIS-III/WMS-III?
Hypothesis 2. Just as litigation status has been a variable to consider in forensic contexts
because of its association with poor neuropsychological performance, it is hypothesized that
overtly seeking accommodations and/or stimulant medications will be associated with inflated
failure rates on tests of noncredible performance. Therefore, it is expected that the External
Incentive group will perform significantly more poorly from the other two groups (No External
Incentive and Control) on all validity indices. For those indices where low performance indicates
a high probability of noncredible performance, it is expected that the External Incentive group
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will show the lowest mean scores. For those indices where higher scores indicate an increased
probability of malingering, it is expected that the External Incentive group will show the highest
mean scores. Moreover, the author expects that a higher proportion of clients in the External
Incentive group will score in the noncredible range on the validity indices than those in the other
groups.
Question 3
Does the proportion of positive cases and overall proportional degree of severity of
malingering vary positively along the control – no external incentive – external incentive
dimension?
Hypothesis 3. Given that the clinical setting of this study is utilized by a high number of
those seeking external gain, and that recent research has demonstrated a high failure rate on the
Word Memory Test in a similar population, the rate of noncredible performance according to the
Slick Criteria in the entire clinical sample is expected to be similar to rates in other general
clinical settings where compensation seeking is a factor (20%). That rate should skew highest
among persons in the External Incentive group as rates have been shown to be higher in groups
containing an increased number of clients overtly seeking external gain (Ardolf et al., 2007;
Mittenberg et al., 2002). Moreover, the rate of noncredible performance is expected to
progressively increase according to group along the incentive seeking dimension (control, no
external incentive, external incentive).
Question 4
Do those reporting a history of previous psychological diagnoses have a higher rate of
noncredible performance than those who did not report such a history?
Hypothesis 4. It is hypothesized that those with self-reported, pre-existing cognitive
disorders will have a lower rate of noncredible performance. It is thought that those individuals
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are less likely to exaggerate their deficits in order to obtain external gain, since the basis for
obtaining accommodations has been established by previous health providers – often years prior
to the current evaluation. On the other hand, those seeking new diagnoses may have a higher
need to overstate or exaggerate deficits since they have demonstrated satisfactory scholastic
performance to the degree that qualified them for university study.
Questions 5 and 6
What is the association between meeting Slick Criteria for probable MND and the
outcomes of ultimate diagnosis and treatment recommendations? Is there an association between
being categorized as putting forth noncredible testing behavior, according to the Slick Criteria,
and likelihood of obtaining accommodations and/or medication referrals as recommended by the
psychological clinic?
Hypothesis 5. Preliminary findings from simulation studies (Harrison et al., 2007; Osmon et al.,
2006) and initial clinical observations of failure of indices from the Word Memory Test have
been associated with decreased performance on some cognitive measures in LD and ADHD
malingering. Moreover, effort has been associated with a considerable amount of variance in
cognitive testing performance (Green et al., 2001). Accordingly, it is expected that a
disproportionate percentage of those meeting Slick Criteria in the current study will be diagnosed
with current brain based disorders (e.g., Cognitive Disorder NOS, ADHD, LD) as an outcome of
their current psychoeducational evaluation.
Hypothesis 6. Because it is thought that those meeting the Slick Criteria for probable
MND exaggerate neurocognitive deficits on objective measures, they are also more likely to
receive recommendations to address those apparent deficiencies if their simulation goes
undetected. Moreover, since most clinic evaluations did not utilize validity indices and that
researchers claim behavioral observations alone are poor indicators of noncredible performance
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(Faust, Guilmette et al., 1988; Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 1988; Frederick, Sarfaty, Johnston, &
Powel, 1994; Heaton et al., 1978), those retrospectively meeting Slick Criteria as per the current
study, were likely not identified as putting forth malingered performance at the time of their
evaluation. Therefore, those clients meeting Slick Criteria were probably most likely to be
recommended to receive academic accommodations and/or recommended for a medication
consultation at a higher rate than those not meeting criteria for probable MND because they
demonstrated impairment on cognitive testing sufficient to justify obtaining a diagnosis and
accompanying recommendations.
Question 7
What are the specificity values for each derived WAIS-III/WMS-III validity index when
compared with a nonclinical control sample and a clinical sample expressing no overt external
incentive?
Hypothesis 7. Specificity levels of many of the WAIS-III/WMS-III embedded indices
have shown to be lower when groups meeting Slick Criteria are compared with non-MND
clinical groups as opposed to comparison with normal control participants. The specificity levels
of each validity index in this study are expected to be greater when those meeting the Slick
Criteria are compared to the nonclinical control group rather than when compared to those not
overtly seeking external incentives those seeking external incentives but not meeting Slick
Criteria for probable MND.
Question 8
How effective is each test according to varying theoretical base rates when considering
sensitivity, specificity, and hypothetical base rates of noncredible performance? As this is an
entirely exploratory matter, no specific hypotheses are forwarded for this research question.
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Methods
Participants and Data
The author utilized archival data from two sources for this project. The first dataset
consisted of normative data from a portion of a large-scale joint experimental and clinical
working memory project conducted between May 2005 and December 2006 at a public
university in the southern United States. As part of that construct validation research protocol,
participants were administered tests of intellectual functioning, memory functioning, and
experimental measures of cognitive functioning. For the purposes of this study, the author
utilized only intellectual and memory functioning data forming a large control sample. Of the
224 participants that originally agreed to participate in that study to obtain extra credit in
undergraduate psychology courses, complete data from 182 participants were obtained.
Exclusion criteria included visual and/or hearing impairment (n = 14), a psychiatric diagnosis
resulting in cognitive impairment (n = 0), English as a second language (n = 5), or if the
participant did not complete the study protocol (n = 23). No participant was excluded according
to gender, race, ethnicity, or academic status. All participants were provided informed consent as
part of the research protocol. Mean age in the control sample was 20.56 (SD = 3.67) with 47
(25.8%) males and 135 females (74.2%). Most participants were Caucasian (149, 81.9%).
Another 15 (8.2%) were African American, 6 were Hispanic (3.3%), and 12 (6.6%) were
identified as other.
The second data source consisted of information obtained from clients seeking services at
the university’s Psychological Services Center from 1999 to 2008. Exclusion criteria included
visual and/or hearing impairment, current psychiatric or neurological disorders warranting legal
disability status, history of moderate-severe traumatic brain injury, stroke, dementia,
chronic/severe neurological condition(s), or English as a second language. While the final
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clinical sample was 986, the clients were administered a fixed/flexible battery and therefore the
individual test-by-test analyses presented here may not employ the entire sample but be limited
to those who completed the particular measure of interest. Participants in this study were
typically individuals self-referred to the clinic and evaluated for possible psychoeducational
problems using a broad battery surveying domains of intelligence, memory, attention, academic
achievement, and psychological/emotional functioning. All clinical participants consented to
have their assessment information used confidentially in future research. This project was
reviewed and approved by the Louisiana State University Institutional Review Board.
Individuals presented for assessment with a variety of primary complaints generally
including depression or anxiety symptoms, learning problems, memory problems, and/or
attentional concerns in the context of a university setting. As part of a comprehensive
psychoeducational assessment, individuals were administered tests of intellectual functioning,
memory functioning, attention/concentration, academic achievement, and psychological
functioning. For the purposes of this study, only the testing data regarding intellectual and
memory functioning were analyzed. Mean age in the clinical sample was 22.62 (SD = 6.80) with
513 (52.0%) males and 473 females (47.9%). Participant ethnic groups included Caucasian (n =
836, 84.7%), African American of (n = 112, 11.3%), Asian (n = 6, .6%), Hispanic (n = 18,
1.8%), Middle-Eastern (n = 6, .6%), and other (8, .8%). Demographic characteristics of the
clinical sample regarding primary DSM-IV-TR diagnostic category are presented in Table 2.
Additionally, 28.1% of those diagnosed with primary Axis I disorder also met criteria for
another, co-occuring Axis I disorder (Table 3). Presentation of diagnostic rates in each clinical
group (No External Incentive, External Incentive) is in Tables 4 and 5.
Procedures
For the experimental study, all measures were either administered by a senior level clinical
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Table 2
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Primary Diagnostic Category in the Clinical Group
n

%

Depressive Disorders

75

7.6

Anxiety Disorders

114

11.6

Adjustment Disorders

12

1.2

Bipolar Disorders

15

1.5

Other Mood Disorders

4

.4

ADHD

236

23.9

Learning Disorders

173

17.5

Academic Problems (v-code)

12

1.2

Cognitive Disorders

84

8.5

Eating Disorders

2

0.2

Substance Use Disorders

9

0.9

Misc. V-Codes

5

0.5

Information Unavailable

5

0.5

Other

16

1.6

Diagnosis Deferred

15

1.5

No Diagnosis

209

21.2

Total

986

100
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Table 3
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Co-Occurring Secondary Diagnostic Category in the
Clinical Group
n

%

Depressive Disorders

48

4.7

Anxiety Disorders

87

8.8

Adjustment Disorders

10

1.0

Other Mood Disorders

4

0.4

ADHD

28

2.8

Learning Disorders

67

6.8

Academic Problems (v-code)

7

0.7

Cognitive Disorders

7

0.7

Eating Disorders

1

0.1

Substance Use Disorders

17

1.7

Misc. V-Codes

5

0.5

Other

2

0.2

Total

283

28.4
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Table 4
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Primary Diagnostic Category in the External Incentive
Group
n

%

Depressive Disorders

21

4.1

Anxiety Disorders

43

8.5

Adjustment Disorders

5

1

Bipolar Disorders

6

1.2

Other Mood Disorders

2

.4

ADHD

151

29.7

Learning Disorders

115

22.6

Academic Problems (v-code)

6

1.2

Cognitive Disorders

50

9.8

Eating Disorders

1

.2

Substance Use Disorders

2

.4

Misc. V-Codes

2

.2

Information Unavailable

2

.2

Other

9

1.8

Diagnosis Deferred

6

1.2

No Diagnosis

87

17.1

Total

508

100

64

Table 5
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Primary Diagnostic Category in the No External
Incentive Group
n

%

Depressive Disorders

54

11.3

Anxiety Disorders

71

14.9

Adjustment Disorders

7

1.5

Bipolar Disorders

9

1.9

Other Mood Disorders

2

.4

ADHD

85

17.8

Learning Disorders

58

12.1

Academic Problems (v-code)

6

1.3

Cognitive Disorders

34

7.1

Eating Disorders

1

.2

Substance Use Disorders

7

1.5

Misc. V-Codes

3

.6

Information Unavailable

3

.6

Other

7

1.5

Diagnosis Deferred

9

1.9

No Diagnosis

122

25.5

Total

478

100
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psychology graduate student specializing in neuropsychology or by an advanced undergraduate
research assistant trained to administer the measures according to standardized instructions in the
respective manuals. The research assistant was supervised on an ongoing basis to ensure
maintained consistency and fidelity of test administration. The measures were given in one
session, which took approximately two and a half hours to complete. While the administration
order was counterbalanced during the experimental project, no such experimental control was
possible for the clinical group. However, administration order effects for the WAIS-III and
WMS-III are insignificant (Zhu & Tulsky, 2000), so strict counterbalancing was not a concern
clinically.
For the clinical data, clinical psychology graduate students trained in test administration,
theory, and application administered and scored all tests according to standardization procedures.
As part of a full psychoeducational evaluation, clients were also administered a clinical
interview. During this process, clients provided informed consent for psychological services,
underwent full evaluation, and were provided with feedback regarding cognitive and emotional
status that included diagnostic impressions.
Data Integrity
To ensure data integrity, completed protocols from the experimental project were
carefully checked for errors and corrected along each of the three stages of data checking. That
procedure consisted of 1) initially having trained undergraduate research assistants rescore and
recalculate all subtest raw scores, 2) then converting all raw scores to standardized scores based
on the national normative sample, and 3) finally entering those data into a computer spreadsheet.
Through that process, it was discovered that there was at least one error in approximately 8.5%
of the participants’ data files, which were subsequently corrected. Correlations between the
original dataset and the corrected dataset were all greater than .90 for every single variable in the
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dataset, with an overall multiple correlation between original and corrected datasets exceeding
.98. Data from the clinical and experimental samples were then checked for extreme values,
outliers (four standard deviations away from the mean), data misentries, and any values not
associated with particular tests. On the basis of that analysis, no participant was excluded.
Grouping Variables
In order to establish group status in the clinical sample, client charts were reviewed for
their referral sources and reasons for referral. From that information, group determination was
made according to each client’s expressed reason for obtaining a psychoeducational evaluation.
Accordingly, when the clinical demographic
information included clients’ expressed interest in obtaining recommendations for academic
accommodations and/or stimulant medication, they were categorized into the External Incentive
group (n = 508). Of those in the External Incentive group, 428 (84.3%) were seeking academic
accommodations, 50 (9.8%) were seeking medications, 30 (5.9%) were seeking medications and
accommodations. If no such information was available to indicate such incentive seeking, the
clients were designated into the No External Incentive group (n = 478). According to reliability
coding analysis, 91% agreement of group status was obtained by independent raters. In the
discrepant cases, the lead researcher (R.P.) independently reviewed the cases and determined
group status to resolve conflicting values. Therefore, three groups were derived for this project:
1) Control, 2) No External Incentive, and 3) External Incentive.
Measures
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991)
The PAI is a self-report objective measure of personality traits and clinical symptoms
consisting of 344 statements on which participants can answer as False, Slightly True, Mainly
True, or Very True. Each response form is computer scored and responses are compared with the
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normative sample. Upon scoring, the PAI provides t-scores for four validity and nine clinical
scales, with t-scores > 70 indicating clinically notable elevations. The Negative Impression
Management (NIM) validity scale is one of the most useful measures of symptom exaggeration
(Boccaccini, Murrie, & Duncan, 2006; Calhoun, Earnst, Tucker, Kirby, & Beckham, 2000;
Rogers, Sewell, Cruise, Wang, & Ustad, 1998). Rogers et al. (1998) suggested that a t-score of
> 77 correctly classifies 74% of honest responders and 84% of malingerers. Calhoun et al. (2000)
reported using t-score cut ranging from 73 to 81. Boccaccini et al. (2006) indicated that using a
cutoff of 81 in a forensic facility correctly identified 91% of malingerers who were diagnosed
according to the Structured Inventory of Reported Symptoms (SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens,
1992). However, 70% of those misidentified as malingerers according to the NIM score
performed in the “indeterminate” range of malingering on the SIRS, which is just below the
cutoff for definite malingering and strongly suggests a negative response bias. Rogers, Sewell,
Morey, and Ustad (1996) have also devised a discriminant function that has shown utility in
differentiating malingered performance (Baity, Siefert, Chambers, & Blais, 2007; Sumanti,
Boone, Savodnik, & Gorsuch, 2006). Moreover, the Malingering Index (Gaies, 1994) of the PAI
has shown to be robust index of feigning in several samples (Blanchard, McGrath, Pogge, &
Khadivi, 2003; Wang et al.).
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997a)
Intellectual functioning was measured by the WAIS-III. In most cases, all subtests except
the optional Object Assembly subtest were administered according to standardized protocol.
Participants’ raw scores were compared according to age with the national standardization
sample and converted to scaled and standard scores according to standard manualized procedures
as per the administration manuals (Wechsler, 1997a, 1997b)
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Wechsler Memory Scale – Third Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997b)
Memory functioning was measured by the Wechsler Memory Scale-III. For the WMS-III,
no optional subtests were administered. Since the WAIS-III and WMS-III contain identical
Letter-Number Sequencing and Digit Span subtests, each subtest was administered only once on
either measure.
Malingering Index Scores from the WAIS-III/WMS-III and PAI
Each index score for the measures was calculated according to methodology as described
by the researcher noted below. In accordance with current recommendations (Bianchini et al.,
2001; Greve & Bianchini, 2004), the author employed only those measures validated by at least
one study using a known groups design. The following measures have also been shown to be
useful in differentiating simulated noncredible performance as well (see above review). The
following scores will be derived from the indices in Table 6 order to apply Slick et al.’s (1999)
criteria to individual cases. Table 6 also contains cutoff scores used to categorize clinical patients
according to the Slick Criteria for probable response bias. As recommended elsewhere (Babikian
et al., 2006), evidence from two or more measures fulfilling Criterion B level evidence should
suggest noncredible performance according to Slick Criteria. Therefore, performance on any two
or more of the indices from the WAIS-III/WMS-III associated with noncredible performance are
sufficient to meet Criterion B level evidence to support a finding of a probable noncredible case.
Another method to classify as probable involves obtaining evidence from at least one of the
WAIS-III/WMS-III indices and self-report evidence of a response bias from the PAI. As a result,
several possible combinations are available to establish probable noncredible performance. To
guard against false positive findings of noncredible performance, the author chose cutoff scores
with high specificity (90% to 100%). In keeping with the conservative approach, any indices that
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share subtest values in their calculation (e.g., Mittenberg Index and Reliable Digits) were only
used to fulfill only one of the two B2 level findings per case.
Table 6
Cutoff Scores Corresponding to Index
Index

Cutoff Score

Reliable Digit Span (Greiffenstein et al., 1994)

<6

Mittenberg Index (Mittenberg et al., 1995)

> .21

Vocabulary minus Digit Span (Mittenberg et al., 1995)

>4

Maximum Digits Forward (Babikian et al., 2006; Heinly et al., 2005)

<4

Age-Corrected Scale Score (Iverson, 1991; Iverson & Franzen, 1994)

<4

Processing Speed Index (Etherton, Bianchini, Heinly et al., 2006)

< 70

Rarely Missed Index (Killgore & DellaPietra, 2000b)

< 40

WAIS-III Working Memory (Etherton, Bianchini, Ciota et al., 2006)

< 70

Faces I (Glassmire et al., 2003)

< 23

Auditory Delayed Recognition (Langeluddecke & Lucas, 2003)

< 42

Ord et al. Index (Ord et al., 2007)

>3

Negative Impression Management t-score (Morey, 1991)

> 81t

Roger’s Discriminant Function t-score (Rogers et al., 1996)

> 60t

Malingering Index (Morey, 1991)

>3
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Results
Hypothesis 1
Those in the External Incentive group will show significantly lower performance on
the WAIS-III and WMS-III when compared to the No External Incentive and Control
groups, particularly on measures of thinking speed and attention. WAIS-III FSIQ scores by
group were in the average range: Control (M = 110.13, SD = 11.32), No External Incentive (M =
105.62, SD = 12.60), and External Incentive (M = 101.63, SD = 12.47). To test the first
hypothesis, two separate one-way MANOVA’s were conducted to determine if control and
clinical groups differed on subtests from the measures of intelligence and memory. The first
MANOVA included Group (Control, External Incentive, and No External Incentive) X WAIS-III
subtests (Picture Completion, Vocabulary, Digit-Symbol Coding, Similarities, Block Design,
Arithmetic, Picture Arrangement, Matrix Reasoning, Information, Digit Span, Letter-Number
Sequencing, Comprehension, and Symbol Search). All power analyses were performed with
G*Power 3.0.3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The number of participants needed for
power, (1 – β) = .95, and significance level α = .05 resulted in total sample size of 180 needed to
detect a small effect (0.10). Upon a significant omnibus F test, follow-up univariate F-tests were
conducted to determine which subtests differ between groups. A separate power analysis was
conducted to ensure that the sample size would be adequate to detect a small/medium difference
between the groups. Based on that analysis, a sample size of 690 would suffice.
The MANOVA revealed a significant between group main effect F (13, 1114) = 11.03,
p < .0001, η2 = .116. Results from that analysis with appropriate univariate and Bonferroni posthoc follow-up procedures are presented in Table 7. As can be seen from the post-hoc
comparisons, all predicted group differences fell in the expected direction with the External
Incentive group scoring lower than the other two groups across all subtests.
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Table 7
Univariate Analysis of Variance for WAIS-III Variables by Group (Clinical v. Control)
Control
(n = 182)

No External
Incentive
(n = 442)

External
Incentive
(n = 490)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Vocabularyabc

13.01 (2.37)

11.77 (2.67)

Similaritiesb

11.61 (2.71)

Arithmeticbc

F

p

Partial etasquared

11.10 (2.85)

33.51

.001

.057

11.03 (2.81)

10.64 (2.88)

8.09

.001

.014

10.74 (2.36)

10.56 (2.60)

9.65 (2.93)

17.42

.001

.030

Digit Spanabc

11.41 (2.73)

10.08 (2.78)

9.34 (2.70)

38.49

.001

.065

Informationbc

11.70 (2.41)

11.39 (2.65)

10.60 (2.75)

15.83

.001

.028

Comprehension

11.91 (2.47)

11.66 (2.68)

11.37 (2.87)

3.01

.050

.005

Letter-Number Seq.abc

11.45 (2.72)

10.59 (2.62)

9.86 (2.64)

25.68

.001

.044

Picture Completionbc

10.73 (3.09)

10.54 (2.95)

10.06 (3.00)

4.72

.009

.008

Digit Symbol Cdabc

11.54 (2.53)

9.36 (2.51)

8.78 (2.65)

76.82

.001

.121

Block Designbc

11.20 (2.81)

10.79 (2.84)

10.24 (3.01)

8.64

.001

.015

Matrix Reasoningbc

12.21 (2.07)

11.91 (2.58)

11.34 (2.71)

9.91

.001

.018

Picture Arrangement

10.37 (2.75)

10.21 (2.64)

10.01 (2.82)

1.34

.263

.002

Symbol Searchabc

12.04 (2.43)

10.06 (2.71)

9.39 (2.73)

64.88

.001

.105

a

Control v. No External Incentive, bControl v. External Incentive, cExternal Incentive v. No
External Incentive
Note. All Flagged Post-Hoc Comparisons, p < .05
However, based on those analyses, there were no significant group differences on the
Comprehension or Picture Arrangement subtests. In keeping with the initial hypothesis, it was
the measures of processing speed and attentional control that demonstrated the largest group
differences (i.e., Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Digit-Symbol Coding, Symbol Search).
Nonparametric analyses via the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test also supported hypothesis one as
lower scores were strongly associated with the External Incentive group as opposed to the No
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External Incentive group, W+ (13) = 91, p < .001, and Control group, W+ (13) = 91, p < .001.
Therefore, those clients explicitly seeking external gain demonstrated lower performance than
controls and clients not reporting potential for external gain, particularly on the measures of
processing speed and attentional control.
Similar analyses were conducted for the WMS-III subtests. Mean scores for the WMS-III
General Memory Index by group were as follows: Control (M = 107.62, SD = 10.69), No
External Incentive (M = 100.97, SD = 13.98), and External Incentive (M = 98.51, SD = 13.96).
The second MANOVA included Group (Control, External Incentive, and No External Incentive)
X WMS-III core subtests (Logical Memory I, Faces I, Verbal Paired Associates I, Family
Pictures I, Spatial Span, Logical Memory II, Faces II, Verbal Paired Associates II, Family
Pictures II). A power analysis was performed to determine the number of participants needed for
power, (1 – β) = .95, and significance level, α = .05 resulting in total sample size of 150 to detect
a small effect (0.10). Upon a significant omnibus F, follow-up univariate F-tests were conducted
to determine which subtests differ between groups. A separate power analysis was conducted to
ensure that the sample size would be adequate to detect a small/medium difference (0.15)
between the groups. Based on that analysis, a sample size of 690 was needed. The MANOVA
revealed a significant between group main effect of group F (8, 1151) = 4.44, p < .0001, η2 =
.03.
Results from appropriate univariate and post-hoc follow-up procedures are presented in
Table 8. While mean group performance on all of the measures were in the expected direction
with the External Incentive group scoring lower than the other two groups, the External Incentive
group only performed significantly lower than the No External Incentive and Control groups on
the Logical Memory subtests, thus partially supporting the hypothesis. Nonparametric analyses
via the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test also supported the hypothesis as lower scores on the
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Table 8
Univariate Analysis of Variance for WMS-III Variables by Group (Clinical v. Control)
Control
(n = 182)

No External
Incentive
(n = 466)

External
Incentive
(n = 503)

F

p

Partial
etasquared

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Logical Memory Iabc

11.13 (2.53)

10.09 (2.84)

9.55 (2.81)

21.81

.001

.037

Faces Ib

10.38 (2.92)

9.93 (2.93)

9.60 (2.98)

4.88

.008

.008

Verbal Paired Ass. Ib

10.67 (2.51)

10.32 (2.93)

9.98 (2.97)

4.18f

.016

.007

Family Pictures Iab

10.90 (2.40)

10.05 (3.11)

9.82 (3.18)

8.43

.001

.014

Logical Memory IIabc

11.76 (2.66)

10.41 (2.95)

9.84 (2.84)

30.19

.001

.050

Faces IIab

10.41 (2.58)

9.83 (2.67)

9.79 (2.79)

3.73

.024

.006

Verbal Paired Ass. IIab

11.19 (1.75)

10.59 (2.55)

10.42 (2.69)

6.33f

.002

.011

Family Pictures IIab

10.81 (2.43)

9.85 (3.23)

9.64 (3.26)

9.54

.001

.016

a

Control v. No External Incentive, bControl v. External Incentive, cExternal Incentive v. No
External Incentive
Note. All Flagged Post-Hoc Comparisons, p < .05
WMS-III were strongly associated with the External Incentive group as opposed to the No
External Incentive group, W+ (8) = 36, p = .008, and Control group, W+ (8) = 36, p < .008. In
sum, there was strong support for the predicted group differences on intellectual functioning
measures, but less parametric support for the same contrasts concerning the memory measures.
Nevertheless, all scores fell in the predicted ordinal direction, a finding supported
nonparametrically for both sets of measures.
Hypothesis 2
The External Incentive group will perform significantly different from the other two
groups (No External Incentive and Control) on all validity indices, indicating a higher level
of noncredible performance. To test the second hypothesis, an omnibus MANOVA was

74

conducted and followed by a series of one-way between subjects ANOVA’s subsequent to a
significant MANOVA finding. Group served as the independent variable and each of the
examined WAIS-III/WMS-III validity indices were dependent variables. Given the results from
the power analyses conducted above, the sample size obtained was adequate to detect a small to
medium difference. The MANOVA revealed a significant between group main effect, F (11,
1100) = 12.34, p < .0001, η2 = .109. Appropriate univariate and post-hoc follow-up procedures
are presented in Table 9. Since the Ord et al. and Rarely Missed Indices from the WMS-III
violated conservative conventions for acceptable skewness and/or kurtosis (< -1 or > 1), only
nonparametric comparisons were conducted with those latter two variables.
Table 9
Univariate Analysis of Variance for WAIS-III/WMS-III Validity Indices by Group (Clinical v.
Control)
Control
(n = 182)

No External
Incentive
(n = 435)

External
Incentive
(n = 487)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

WAIS-III WMIabc

106.79 (12.73)

102.25 (13.43)

Processing Speed
Indexabc

109.81 (12.30)

Auditory RecognitionDelayed Rawabc

F

p

Partial etasquared

97.38 (13.55)

36.48

.001

.062

98.40 (12.82)

94.82 (12.99)

91.02

.001

.142

50.81 (2.31)

49.80 (2.75)

49.30 (2.99)

19.67

.001

.035

WMS-III Faces I Rawb

39.23 (4.22)

38.23 (4.60)

37.57 (4.86)

8.63

.001

.015

Max. Digits Fwd.abc

7.20 (1.08)

6.72 (1.28)

6.50 (1.24)

21.16

.001

.037

Mittenberg Index

-.41 (.96)

-.40 (1.05)

-.25 (1.01)

3.03

.049

.005

Reliable Digitsabc

10.95 (2.04)

10.04 (2.14)

9.40 (2.12)

37.39

.001

.064

Vocabulary-Digit Span

1.60 (2.76)

1.72 (3.33)

1.78 (3.36)

.20

.816

.001

a

Control v. No External Incentive, bControl v. External Incentive, cExternal Incentive v. No
External Incentive
Note. All Flagged Post-Hoc Comparisons p < .05
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Omnibus one-way Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA revealed that group significantly affected the
level of performance on the Ord et al. Index, χ2 (2, 1152) = 33.27, p < .0001 (Table 10). In order
to specify which groups differed according to the dependent variable, follow-up pairwise
comparisons were conducted with Mann-Whitney U, controlling α for multiple comparisons,
establishing significance at p < .017. In the first follow-up comparisons, control participants
performed at a lower rate than those in No External Incentive clinical group, U (1, 648) =
36,415.00, p < .0001, and those in the External Incentive seeking clinical group, U (1, 685) =
.37,069.00, p < .0001. However, the No External Incentive group and External Incentive seeking
clinical groups did not differ, U (1, 969) = 111,992.50, p = .07. Medians, means, and standard
deviations for the Ord et al. index are presented in Table 10. An omnibus one-way KruskalWallis ANOVA revealed that group status was not significantly associated with the scores on the
Rarely Missed Index, χ2 (2, 1146) = .58, p = .75. Due to an insignificant initial omnibus finding,
pairwise group comparisons were not conducted in order to protect against type I error. Medians,
means, and standard deviations for the Rarely Missed Index by group are presented in Table 11.
Table 10
Median, Means, and Standard Deviations for the Ord et al. Index by Group (Clinical v. Control)
Median

Mean (SD)

Control (n = 182)

.00

.05 (.28)

No External Incentive (n = 466)

.00

.30 (.75)

External Incentive (n = 503)

.00

.39 (.85)
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Table 11
Median, Means, and Standard Deviations for the Rarely Missed Index by Group (Clinical v.
Control)
Median

Mean (SD)

Control (n = 182)

204.00

198.46 (24.62)

No External Incentive (n = 464)

204.00

195.99 (29.44)

External Incentive (n = 500)

204.00

194.44 (31.11)

There was general support for hypothesis three as the control participants scored
significantly different than the No External Incentive and the External Incentive groups in the
expected direction on five of ten validity indices. Further support for the hypothesis was also
obtained via a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank analysis. Scores on the indices were associated with
noncredible performance in the External Incentive group compared with the No External
Incentive group, W+ (10) = 55, p = .002, and Control group, W+ (10) = 55, p < .002. Thus, there
was a greater degree of noncredible performance associated with the External Incentive group
rather than the other two groups. Additionally, the aggregated rank differences also strongly
supported the dimensionality assertion in the following hypothesis, for which parametric
statistics also provided moderate support.
Because indices from the PAI (Roger’s Discriminant Function, Malingering Index, &
Negative Impression Management) were only administered to the clinical participants, a separate
MANOVA was conducted comparing only the External Incentive and no External Incentive
groups. The MANOVA revealed a significant between group main effect, F (3, 657) = 7.35, p <
.0001, η2 = .03. While the External Incentive and No External Incentive group did not differ on
the Malingering Index from the PAI, the External Incentive group scored significantly higher on
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Roger’s Discriminant function. Unexpectedly, the No External Incentive demonstrated
significantly higher mean scores on the Negative Impression Management scale, counter to the
author’s hypothesis (Table 12). With the exception of the Negative Impression Management
scale, all mean index scores again fell in the expected direction with the External Incentive group
performing as predicted, supporting the overall hypothesis.
Table 12
Univariate Analysis of Variance for PAI Validity Indices by Clinical Group (No External
Incentive v. External Incentive)
No External
Incentive
(n = 305)

External
Incentive
(n = 356)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Roger’s Function**

50.15 (10.15)

53.20 (10.37)

Malingering Index

.79 (.87)

.78 (.89)

55.15 (12.12)

53.32 (11.03)

Neg. Impression Mgt.*
*p < .05., **p < .001

Hypothesis 3 & Classification of Noncredible Performance
The rate of noncredible performance as per Slick Criteria in the entire clinical sample is
expected to be similar to rates in other general clinical settings where compensation seeking
is a factor (20%) and the rate should be significantly higher among persons in the External
Incentive group. While it was fairly common for control participants to score in the noncredible
range on the Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary Minus Digit Span, failure on others was rare.
Although means from the validity indices for the External Incentive clients reflected greater
levels of noncredible performance than the control participants and No External Incentive group
(see hypothesis two analyses), the proportion of clients falling in the noncredible range according
78

to published cutoff scores on each individual index differed only on three indices (Auditory
Recognition-Delayed Raw, Mittenberg Index, & Reliable Digits) for the External Incentive
group when compared with the No External Incentive group (Tables 13 & 14). This likely
suggests that, while the External Incentive group performed to a greater degree in the direction of
the noncredible range on each index, the difference may not be as clinically meaningful for some
indices. Despite those observations from parametric findings, results from a Wilcoxon SignedRank test revealed that a higher proportion of those in the External Incentive group, compared to
the No External Incentive group, scored in the noncredible range when examining test failure
rate as a whole, W+ (14) = 95, p < .005. Thus the results reflected the predicted ordinality of the
scores by group.
In order to further assess group differences according to failure rates on validity indices,
the author also examined the proportion of clients failing at least one measure. 46.3% of the
External Incentive group failed at least one index from the WAIS-III/WMS-III, indicating
possible noncredible performance according to the Slick Criteria (i.e., only one level of Criterion
B evidence), demonstrating that it was fairly common to fail one or more index. In contrast,
36.8% of the No External Incentive group failed one or more, which is less than the External
Incentive group (46.3%), χ2 (1) = 9.0, p = .003. Table 15 contains the cumulative percentage of
WAIS-III/WMS-III validity indices failed per group. Next, the author presents data regarding
multiple failures. Despite the high failure rates on the Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary Minus
Digit Span, along with some failures on other indices in the control group, none of the control
participants’ combination of index scores met Criterion B of the Slick Criteria, resulting in 100%
specificity for the current classification scheme (i.e., no false positives). The rate of noncredible
performance according to Slick Criteria, when accounting for all indices (including the PAI),
was lower than expected (n = 59, 12.1% of the External Incentive group, 5.98% of the entire
79

Table 13
Participants Scoring beyond Cutoff Scores for Validity Indices by Group*
Control

No External
Incentive

External
Incentive

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

WAIS-III WMI

0 (0)

2 (0.4)

6 (1.2)

Processing Speed Index

0 (0)

4 (0.9)

6 (1.2)

Digit Span Scale Score

0 (0)

4 (0.9)

9 (1.8)

Auditory RecognitionDelayed Rawb

0 (0)

3 (0.6)

15 (3.0)

WMS-III Faces I Raw

0 (0)

1 (0.2)

5 (1.0)

Max. Digits Fwd.

3 (1.6)

10 (2.2)

16 (3.2)

Mittenberg Indexb

42 (23.1)

125 (28)

170 (34.1)

Reliable Digitsb

2 (1.1)

12 (2.6)

32 (6.4)

Vocabulary-Digit Span

40 (22)

131 (27.3)

148 (29.5)

Ord et al. Index

0 (0)

12 (2.6)

20 (4.0)

Rarely Missed Index

0 (0)

2 (0.4)

1 (0.2)

Roger’s Functiona

---

59 (19.3)

81 (22.8)

Malingering Indexa

---

12 (3.9)

16 (4.5)

Neg. Impression Mgta

---

20 (6.6)

16 (4.5)

*Reflects percentage of participants in analyses.
a
Index not administered to control participants.
b
All Flagged Chi-Square Comparisons: No External Incentive vs. External Incentive, p < .05.
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Table 14
Participants Scoring beyond Cutoff Scores for Validity Indices for Control and Total Clinical
Group*
Control

Clinical

n (%)

n (%)

WAIS-III WMI

0 (0)

8 (0.8)

Processing Speed Index

0 (0)

10 (1.0)

Digit Span Scale Score

0 (0)

13 (1.4)

Auditory RecognitionDelayed Raw

0 (0)

18 (1.9)

WMS-III Faces I Raw

0 (0)

6 (0.6)

Max. Digits Fwd.

3 (1.6)

26 (2.7)

Mittenberg Index

42 (23.1)

295 (31.2)

Reliable Digits

2 (1.1)

44 (4.6)

Vocabulary-Digit Span

40 (22)

279 (29.1)

Ord et al. Index

0 (0)

32 (3.3)

Rarely Missed Index

0 (0)

3 (0.3)

Roger’s Functiona

---

140 (21.2)

Malingering Indexa

---

28 (4.2)

Neg. Impression Mgta

---

36 (5.4)

*Reflects percentage of participants in analyses..
a
Index not administered to control participants.
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Table 15
Number of WAIS-III/WMS-III Indices Failed according to Percentage of Participants beyond
Cutoff Scores
Control

No External
Incentive

External
Incentive

Total
Clinical

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

0

123 (67.6)

302 (63.2)

273 (53.7)

575 (58.3)

1

35 (19.2)

75 (15.7)

102 (20.1)

177 (18.0)

2

21 (11.5)

79 (16.5)

96 (18.9)

175 (17.7)

3

2 (1.1)

13 (2.7)

17 (3.3)

30 (3.0)

4

1 (0.5)

7 (1.5)

15 (3.0)

22 (2.2)

5

---

2 (0.4)

2 (0.4)

4 (0.4)

---

2 (0.4)

2 (0.2)

7

1 (0.2)

1 (0.1)

8

---

---

Number of
Indices Failed

6

clinical sample). Please recall that those in the No External Incentive group did not satisfy
Criterion A (presence of a substantial external incentive) of the Slick Criteria, thus precluding
them from meeting full Slick Criteria for MND. However, members of the No External Incentive
group (n = 42, 9.7%) did have index combinations that satisfied Slick Criterion B (see
classification scheme in the Methods section), which was not significantly different from the
External Incentive group (12.1%), χ2 (1) = 2.1, p = .14. However, this lack of finding is likely
due to the imperfect classification methodology of group assignment. When using the WAISIII/WMS-III indices alone, the rate of positive Criterion B findings in the External Incentive
group dropped to just 17 (3.5%) and 9 (0.9%) in the No External Incentive group, χ2 (1) = 2.1,
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p = .15. Therefore, just 3% (n = 26) of the entire clinical group met Criterion B evidence when
only using the WAIS-III/WMS-III. As a result, excluding the PAI indices in the present analyses
would have resulted in not identifying at least a 72.2% of those meeting Slick Criteria in this
sample. Regardless of incentive level, 10.2% of the entire clinical sample met Criterion B of the
Slick Criteria when combining failure rates across the WAIS-III/WMS-III and PAI indices (see
Table 16 for description of Criterion B rate according to group), which was lower than expected.
Table 16
Frequency of Participants by Group Satisfying Criterion B from the Slick Criteria according to
Index Type
WAIS-III/WMS-III
Indices Only

All
Indices

n (%)

n (%)

0 (0%)

N/A

No External Incentive

9 (0.9%)

42 (9.7)

External Incentive

17 (3.5)

59 (12.1)

Control*

*Control Participants not Administered PAI
Concordance of clinical behavioral observations and Slick Criteria follow. Of the 59
clients in the probable MND group, behavioral observations made by the evaluating clinician
during the assessment indicated “fidgety” behavior (n = 1), giving up easily (n = 1), variable
effort (n = 3), anxiety during the session (n = 2), frustration during the session (n = 1), and
fatigue at the time of evaluation (n = 2); no other descriptors of irregular behavior were made.
Thus, in at least 48 (81%) of the probable noncredible cases, clients were not behaviorally
identified as putting forth questionably valid performance even though the combination of
embedded validity measures indicated otherwise, highlighting importance of including measures
of validity in psychoeducational evaluations and replicating and amplifying the cautions
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espoused by Faust and Ziskin (1988) regarding the failure of clinicians to be able to identify
noncredible performance based on performance observations alone.
Hypothesis 4
It is hypothesized that those with self-reported pre-existing cognitive disorders will
have a lower rate of noncredible performance as they have previously established that they
have cognitive deficits in order to obtain external gain. Therefore, they may not feel the
need to exaggerate their deficits. To test the assumption that self-reported history of diagnosed
learning problems, special education, cognitive disorders, or diagnosed attentional conditions
would not be associated with increased failure on the indices, Chi Square Tests of Independence
were conducted with history of self-reported cognitive problems as the independent measure and
proportion of failure on each of the indices as dependent measures.
As can be seen in Table 17, such self-report was not associated with noncredible
performance on individual indices after controlling for multiple comparisons by adjusting the
significance level (p < .0035). Nevertheless, results from a Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test revealed
that, overall, failure on validity indices was actually associated with those reporting a history of
cognitive problems compared to those not reporting such a history, W+ (14) = 83, p < .05. Also
counter to hypothesis four, this variable was associated with performing in the probable
noncredible range according to Slick Criteria as 25 (4.6%) of those without a history of cognitive
problems fell into the probable noncredible range while 34 (7.7%) of those with such selfreported problems met criteria for probable noncredible performance, χ2 (1) = 4.14, p = .042.
Therefore, those with a history of cognitive problems tended to fail the indices and their pattern
and rates of failure also resulted in higher incidents of Criterion B classification. As a result, this
hypothesis was not generally supported, but there were conflicting findings.
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Table 17
Rates of Noncredible Performance by History of Cognitive Problems*
History of
Cognitive
Problems
(n = 440)

No History of
Cognitive
Problems
(n = 541)

Index

n (%)

n (%)

Working Memory < 70

5 (1.2)

3 (0.6)

Processing Speed < 70

5 (1.6)

5 (1.0)

Digit Span Scaled Score < 4a

10 (2.3)

3 (0.6)

Aud. Rec. Raw < 42

11 (2.6)

7 (1.3)

Faces I Raw < 23

2 (0.5)

4 (0.8)

Max. Digits Fwd. < 4

15 (3.5)

11 (2.1)

150 (35.1)

145 (28.2)

Reliable Digits < 6

26 (6.1)

18 (3.4)

Voc.-Digit Span > 4

128 (29.7)

150 (28.7)

Ord et al. Index > 3a

20 (4.6)

12 (2.3)

Rarely Missed Index < 40

0 (0.0)

3 (0.6)

Roger’s Function > 60ta

76 (24.9)

63 (17.8)

Malingering Index > 3

11 (3.6)

17 (4.8)

Neg. Imp. Mgt > 81ta

10 (3.3)

26 (7.4)

Mittenberg Index > .21a

*Reflects percentage of participants in analyses.
a
p < .05
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Hypothesis 5
It is expected that those meeting Slick Criteria for probable MND in the current
study will be diagnosed with current brain based disorders (e.g., Cognitive Disorder NOS,
ADHD, LD) most frequently as an outcome of their current psychoeducational evaluation.
This hypothesis was investigated by subdividing the probable MND group and remaining clinical
group according to DSM-IV-TR diagnostic category. As can be seen in Table 18, 79.7%
(n = 47) of those meeting Slick Criteria were diagnosed with some mental disorder according to
their psychoeducational evaluation, which was slightly higher, but not significantly different
from that observed in the remainder of the total clinical sample (n = 693, 74.8%), χ2 (1) = .71, p
= .40. However, the percentage of the remaining clinical group diagnosed with a psychiatric
diagnosis was higher (n = 239, 25.8%) than those in the MND group (n = 8, 13.6%), χ2 (1) = 4.4,
p = .036. In contrast, the rate of being diagnosed with a brain based disorder in the probable
MND group (n = 38, 64.4%) was higher than the remainder of the entire clinical group (49.1%, n
= 455), χ2 (1) = 5.2, p = .02. Thus, while the rate of diagnoses did not appear to be higher in the
probable MND group compared with the remainder of the clinical group as a whole, the rate of
disorders specifically related to cognitive dysfunction was higher. Support of this hypothesis
suggests that those meeting Slick Criteria in this sample obtained a disproportionate rate of
cognitive diagnoses despite strong evidence from the embedded measures that they likely
exaggerated deficits. Information regarding diagnostic comorbidity in the MND group is
presented in Table 19.
Related to Hypothesis Five is the observance that the frequency of psychiatric diagnoses
in the No External Incentive (n = 158, 33%) group was higher than the External Incentive group
(n = 89, 17.5%), χ2 (1) = 31.7, p < .001. However, in mirroring the findings of the MND
analyses, the proportion of those diagnosed with a brain-based disorder in the External
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Table 18
Frequency and Percentage of Primary Axis I Diagnoses in the Probable MND Group
n

%

Major Depressive Episode

1

1.7

Generalized Anxiety Disorder

1

1.7

Bipolar Disorder

1

1.7

Obsessive Compulsive Disorder

1

1.7

Cyclothymic Disorder

1

1.7

Adjustment Disorder

1

1.7

Academic Problem

1

1.7

Autism Spectrum Disorder

1

1.7

Information Unavailable

1

1.7

Anxiety Disorder, NOS

2

3.4

Reading Disorder

2

3.4

Math Disorder

2

3.4

Disorder of Written Expression

2

3.4

Diagnosis Deferred

2

3.4

Amnestic Disorder

4

6.8

Learning Disorder, NOS

7

11.9

Cognitive Disorder, NOS

8

13.6

No Diagnosis

8

13.6

ADHD

13

22

87

Table 19
Frequency and Percentage of Cases by Co-Occurring Secondary Diagnostic Category in the
Probable MND Group
n

%

Depressive Disorders

2

3.4

Anxiety Disorders

6

10.2

Adjustment Disorders

1

1.7

Schizoaffective Disorder

1

1.7

ADHD

4

6.8

Learning Disorders

3

5.1

Misc. V-Codes

2

3.4

Incentive (n = 316, 62.2%) group was higher than the No External Incentive group (n = 183,
38.3%), χ2 (1) = 56.4, p < .001. Taken together, the results suggest that even overtly seeking an
external incentive in a psychoeducational evaluation is associated with obtaining a diagnosis for
a brain-based disorder.
Hypothesis 6
This hypothesis predicts that those clients meeting Slick Criteria for probable MND were
likely to be recommended to receive academic accommodations and/or be recommended
for a medication consultation at a higher rate than those not meeting criteria for probable
MND. The author tested hypothesis six via Chi Square Test of Independence by calculating the
number of individuals recommended to receive academic accommodations and/or medication.
The author first compared proportions of recommendations between the External Incentive (n =
343, 71.0%) and No External Incentive group (n = 211, 47.4%), which indicated a significant
finding, χ2 (1) = 53.61, p = .00001. The next analysis compared the derived probable MND group
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and remaining combined clinical groups according to receiving recommendations for medication
referral and/or academic accommodations by using Chi Square Test of Independence. According
to that analysis, 43 (75.4%) of those in the probable group and 511 (58.7%) of the remaining
clinical patients received one of those recommendations, χ2 (1) = 6.25, p = .012. However, those
meeting Slick Criteria for MND did not receive those recommendations at a higher rate than
those in the remaining External Incentive group (n = 300, 70%), suggesting the recommendation
of accommodations might more likely be related to participants’ status as members of the
External Incentive group than their actual classification as probable MND.
Hypothesis 7
The specificity levels of each validity index will be greater when those meeting the
Slick Criteria are compared to the Control group rather than when compared to the No
External Incentive group and remaining External Incentive group. Sensitivity and
specificity levels were calculated according to proportion of those falling above and below cutoff
scores per group based on comparisons between the probable MND and the control group (Table
20), No External Incentive group (Table 21), and the remaining External Incentive group (nonprobable MND clinical group; Table 22). Values for positive predictive power are provided for
each index according to several theoretical base rate conditions (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%) by
using the calculations outlined by Baldessarini et al. (1983).
The greatest margin of specificity differences between the groups was with Reliable
Digits, which is also the most well validated measure of validity among the indices and the most
specific to detecting noncredible performance. That measure was also followed by the Working
Memory Index and Processing Speed Index indicators as the most specific to probable MND in
this sample. As can be seen from the tables, specificity levels for each index were higher in the
Control group than both clinical groups, supporting the hypothesis. Specificity was also lower, as
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a whole, in the No External Incentive group when compared with the External Incentive group
after removing probable MND clients, W- (13) = 65.5, p = .02. This latter finding was surprising
due to the fact that external incentive was shown, in the previous analyses, to be related to testing
scores and validity index scores. An increased failure rate was expected due to the fact that the
remainder of the External Incentive group presumably had motivation to feign deficits. This
finding may reflect an artifact such that experimental group assignment may not have achieved
pure groups or may be related to other factors noted in the discussion. Other observations from
the tables indicate that when obtaining a failed index score, the probability for noncredible
performance is increased, especially in conditions where the base rate exceeds 20%. However,
the diagnostic confidence in any one failed measure decreases as a direct function of decreasing
hypothetical base rates as has been shown elsewhere (Gouvier, 1999).
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Table 20
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Positive Predictive Power for Validity Indices for Control Group
Positive Predictive Power for Base Rates
Spec

Sens

.10

.20

.30

.40

.50

Working Memory < 70

100

6.8

100

100

100

100

100

Processing Speed < 70

100

15.3

100

100

100

100

100

Digit Span Scaled Score < 4

100

8.5

100

100

100

100

100

Aud. Rec. Raw < 42

100

11.9

100

100

100

100

100

Faces I Raw < 23

100

1.7

100

100

100

100

100

Max. Digits Fwd. < 4

98.4

6.8

32

52

65

74

81

Mittenberg Index > .21

76.9

86.4

29

48

62

71

79

Reliable Digits < 6

98.1

79.7

82

91

95

97

98

Voc.-Digit Span > 4

88

39

27

45

58

68

76

Ord et al. Index > 3

100

15.2

100

100

100

100

100

Rarely Missed Index < 40

100

0

100

100

100

100

100
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Table 21
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Positive Predictive Power for Validity Indices for No External
Incentive
Positive Predictive Power for Base Rates
Spec

Sens

.10

.20

.30

.40

.50

Working Memory < 70

99.6

6.8

65

81

88

92

94

Processing Speed < 70

99.1

15.3

65

81

88

92

94

Digit Span Scaled Score < 4

99.1

8.5

51

70

80

86

90

Aud. Rec. Raw < 42

99.4

11.9

69

83

89

93

95

Faces I Raw < 23

98.2

1.7

9

19

29

39

49

Max. Digits Fwd. < 4

97.8

6.8

26

44

57

67

76

72

86.4

26

44

57

67

76

Reliable Digits < 6

97.4

79.7

77

88

93

95

97

Voc.-Digit Span > 4

72.7

39

14

26

38

49

59

Ord et al. Index > 3

97.4

15.2

39

59

71

80

85

Rarely Missed Index < 40

99.4

0

0

0

0

0

0

Roger’s Function > 60ta

80.7

65.5

27

46

59

69

77

Malingering Index > 3a

96.1

14.5

29

48

61

71

79

Neg. Imp. Mgt > 81ta

93.4

20

25

43

56

67

75

Mittenberg Index > .21

a

Index not administered to control participants.
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Table 22
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Positive Predictive Power for Validity Indices for External Incentive
- Not Probable Group
Positive Predictive Power for Base Rates
Spec

Sens

.10

.20

.30

.40

.50

Working Memory < 70

99.5

6.8

60

77

85

90

93

Processing Speed < 70

100

15.3

100

100

100

100

100

Digit Span Scaled Score < 4

99.1

8.5

51

70

80

86

90

Aud. Rec. Raw < 42

98.2

11.9

42

62

74

82

87

Faces I Raw < 23

99.1

1.7

17

32

45

56

65

Max. Digits Fwd. < 4

97.3

6.8

22

39

52

63

72

73

86.4

26

44

58

68

76

Reliable Digits < 6

95.5

79.7

66

82

88

92

95

Voc.-Digit Span > 4

73.8

39

14

27

39

50

60

Ord et al. Index > 3

97.5

15.2

40

60

72

80

86

Rarely Missed Index < 40

99.9

0

0

0

0

0

0

Roger’s Function > 60ta

85

65.5

33

52

65

74

81

Malingering Index > 3a

97.3

14.5

37

57

70

78

84

Neg. Imp. Mgt > 81ta

98.3

20

57

75

83

89

92

Mittenberg Index > .21

a

Index not administered to control participants.
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Discussion
Performance validity is crucial to consider when conducting and interpreting
neuropsychological testing (Bianchini et al., 2001; Slick et al., 1999). The assessment of client
credibility has been especially stressed when results can be used to demonstrate evidence for
disability status and/or to receive external gain (Bush et al., 2005). Traditionally, feigned
symptoms or deficit/symptom exaggeration has been a concern in the context of litigation,
workers’ compensation, and other situations that may result in financial rewards or relief from
occupational or other duties (Mittenberg et al., 2002). More recently, focus has been turned to
investigate the context of potentially exaggerated neurocognitive deficits in other situations as
well (Delis & Wetter, 2007). In the current study, the author investigated the relationship of
overtly seeking academic accommodations and/or medication referrals and neurocognitive
performance in a university setting through several hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1
Those in the External Incentive group will show significantly lower performance on
the WAIS-III and WMS-III when compared to the No External Incentive and Control
groups, particularly on measures of thinking speed and attention. This hypothesis was
generally supported as the External Incentive group performed significantly lower than the No
External Incentive group on 10 of 13 subtests from the WAIS-III. Although the External
Incentive group did score lower than the No External Incentive group on the remaining three
subtests (Similarities, Comprehension, & Picture Arrangement), the difference did not reach
statistical significance using parametric tests of significance. Comparison of the External
Incentive group with the Control group also showed significantly lower performance on 11 of 13
WAIS-III subtests with the exception of Comprehension and Picture Arrangement. All
comparisons fell in the expected direction nonparametrically, further supporting this hypothesis.
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In contrast to the WAIS-III comparisons, the External Incentive group performed
significantly lower than the No External Incentive group on only the Logical Memory subtests
when contrasting WMS-III memory performance. While the External Incentive group performed
significantly lower on only the Logical Memory subtests in that comparison, they did show
lower absolute scores across all WMS-III subtests, albeit the differences did not rise to statistical
significance parametrically. An additional follow-up Wilcoxon signed rank test did indicate that,
on the whole, the External Incentive group scores on the WMS-III were significantly consistently
lower than those with no explicit motivation for external secondary gain and controls.
The parametric finding that the External Incentive group performed significantly different
from the other clinical group on only Logical Memory in the WMS-III comparison was not
particularly surprising due to the nature of the referrals to the clinic and the face validity of the
measure. For example, the overwhelming majority of referrals to the clinic were sought for
attentional complaints and/or academic difficulties. Since the WMS-III appears as an obvious
memory measure, clients seeking to exaggerate neurocognitive deficits within the present sample
did not likely view the WMS-III as a measure relevant to their alleged current deficits, thus
deficits would not be exaggerated on those tests. This is supported by the fact that the largest
group differences among the WAIS-III subtests related to attentional functioning (i.e., Digit
Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Digit-Symbol Coding, and Symbol Search).
In contrast, the Logical Memory subtests in particular, requires a high level of attentional
skill and cognitive load and may be more likely viewed by the client as a measure relevant to
attentional assessment. Therefore, the two memory measures on the WMS-III that appear most
similar to attentional functioning were performed at the lowest level among clients explicitly
seeking evaluation as a means to obtain an external incentive. Despite this, all scores fell in the
hypothesized direction which resulted in significant nonparametric findings when considering
95

score ranks between groups across all measures of intelligence and memory.
Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis two proposed that the External Incentive group will perform
significantly different from the other two groups (No External Incentive and Control) on
all validity indices, indicating a higher level of noncredible performance. Hypothesis two
was imperfectly but strongly supported with the External Incentive group performing
significantly different from the No External Incentive group on half of the 10 indices from the
WAIS-III/WMS-III. All remaining five parametrically nonsignificant findings with this
comparison fell in the expected direction and the hypothesis was fully supported through
nonparametric analyses. Similarly, the External Incentive group performed significantly different
on seven of the 10 indices when contrasted with the Control group, with all comparisons falling
in the expected direction, indicating a higher degree of noncredible performance. Again, all
nonsignificant findings also fell in the expected direction with additional follow-up Wilcoxon
signed rank tests indicating that the External Incentive group scores on the WMS-III validity
indices were lower than the No External Incentive group. Additionally, the No Incentive group
also performed significantly toward the invalid range on six of 10 WAIS-III/WMS-III validity
indices when compared to the Control group. The results add validity evidence for the embedded
measures as the controls performed in the direction of invalidity to a significantly lesser extent
than clients with and without external incentive. Furthermore, those with stated incentive for
external gain performed more often in the noncredible range to a significantly greater degree
than those not seeking some form of expressively stated secondary gain.
As for the PAI validity indices, the External Incentive group performed significantly
higher than the No External Incentive group only on the Roger’s Discriminant Function.
Contrary to expectations, the No External Incentive group mean scores on the Negative
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Impression Management was higher than the External Incentive group, indicating a higher level
of noncredible performance on that particular index. There was no group difference in the
Malingering Index from the PAI. Thus, there was less support for the hypothesis utilizing the
PAI indices, especially in a standalone capacity.
Overall, none of the mean scores from any one validity index across all groups fell in the
noncredible range, indicating the relatively infrequent occurrence of the extreme degree of
performance required for classification as noncredible. Despite one contradictory finding, the
majority of results supported the general assertion that those overtly seeking external incentives
scored differently than both Controls and those clients not overtly seeking external incentives. In
sum, with additional support from the first hypothesis, these results suggest that clients’ explicit
motivation for testing influences neurocognitive test performance and failure rates on validity
indices as well. Not only that, but it also appears that those without explicit external incentive
seeking behaviors in this context score differently on validity indices than those from the normal
population, which will be addressed below.
Hypothesis 3 & Classification of Noncredible Performance
The rate of noncredible performance as per Slick Criteria in the entire combined
clinical sample is expected to be similar to the rates in other general clinical settings where
compensation seeking is a factor (20%) and the rate should be significantly higher among
persons in the External Incentive group. It was generally expected that the proportion of
noncredible findings on validity indices would be similar to a recent observation in a similar
sample (Sullivan et al., 2007). Overall, 46% of the clients in the External Incentive group met
Slick Criteria for at least possible MND because they failed at least one index from the WAISIII/WMS-III. This was greater than in the No External Incentive group (36.8%), which was on
par with recent reports of failure rates of four embedded validity measures in neuropsychological
97

patients not meeting Slick Criteria (Victor, Boone, Serpa, Buehler, & Zeigler, In Press). A
surprise finding among the control group was a comparably high rate of validity test failures on
individual measures (32.4%), particularly on the Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary Minus Digit
Span which runs counter to what was expected, especially considering this study employed
conservative cutoff scores (Inman & Berry, 2002; Orey et al., 2000). In all, the failure rates
across groups in the current study were above the single index failure rate (22%) from the Word
Memory Test as reported by Sullivan et al. (2007). The overall profile of failure rates supported
the nonparametric dimensionality as hypothesized with the highest failure in the External
Incentive group followed by the No External Incentive and then Control participants.
Despite the seemingly high failure rate on individual indices, Hypothesis Three was not
fully supported as the proportion of clients in the entire clinical group satisfying Slick Criteria
for probable MND was only 6%. This figure did rise to 12% as a proportion of the External
Incentive group alone, though it was far below the expected 50% noted in other settings with a
high rate of external incentive seeking (Mittenberg et al., 2002). Therefore, although groups with
an increased prior probability for malingering contain a higher number of participants meeting
Slick Criteria, the number here did not rise to traditionally high levels consonant with other
highly saturated groups (i.e., defense referrals). Beyond the issue of meeting full criteria for
probable MND (seeking external incentive), 9.7% of the No External Incentive group also
satisfied criterion B of the Slick Criteria (as outlined in the Methods section) when the PAI was
included in the decision matrix. As a whole then, 10.2% of the entire clinical group, irrespective
of incentive seeking status, met criterion B of the Slick Criteria. At minimum, this strongly
suggests the regular identification of some form of noncredible performance on neurocognitive
testing even in those not seeking overtly stated external incentives. However, that does not
necessarily imply malingered performance per se. On the other hand, despite the fact that 32.4%
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off the controls failed at least one validity index, no control participant met Criterion B of the
Slick Criteria. Consequently, no control participant was falsely identified as a malingerer.
The rate of suspected MND in this sample decreased dramatically when using only the
WAIS-III/WMS-III validity indices as the means with which to meet Slick Criteria (3.5% of the
External Incentive group, 0.9% of the No External Incentive group). Therefore, only 3% of the
total sample met Criterion B without using the PAI indices, suggesting a high false negative rate
when relying solely on the Wechsler scales to detect noncredible performance.
Due to the fact that the rates of probable MND were lower than expected, and lower than
other current estimates in similar samples (Sullivan et al., 2007), it is assumed to be an
underestimate. However, Sullivan et al. (2007) did not specifically address the issue of MND as
per Slick Criteria, but simply reported failure rates on singular indices from the Word Memory
Test. Therefore, their report of 22% failure rates do not reflect derivation of malingered
behavior. Though failure rates on multiple indices from the Word Memory Test were likely
substantially lower in that study, they were not reported. Moreover, they did not control for
external incentive seeking and their level may indicate a 22% rate of possible MND, but it is
unclear because they did not account for compensation seeking.
One reason for the somewhat low rate of probable MND in the current sample is the
classification scheme employed in this study utilized a very stringent and conservative
methodology to categorize clients according to the probable MND Slick Criteria (Boone, 2007b;
Larrabee, Greiffenstein, Greve, & Bianchini, 2007). This included using indices with above 90%
specificity as empirically established in brain injured groups, samples with significant cognitive
impairment beyond what is typically associated with specific LD and ADHD and certainly more
impairment than university students (Belanger, Curtiss, Demery, Lebowitz, & Vanderploeg,
2005; Belanger & Vanderploeg, 2005). Hence, failure rates in the current sample are not likely
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due to the mild level of impairment typically served in university clinics.
The author also used multiple indicators according to varying principles (e.g., self-report,
floor effect, performance curve methodologies) to determine noncredible performance that
guarded against capitalizing on chance for meeting Criterion B of the Slick Criteria by requiring
failure on two or more nonoverlapping validity indices (Rosenfeld, Sands, & Van Gorp, 2000).
Furthermore, the lower rate of probable MND in this sample occurred despite the fact that some
of the current measures (Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary-Digit Span) performed with
unacceptably low specificity in the comparable control sample when contrasted with the extant
literature, even when using conservative cutoff scores. As a result, using either the Mittenberg
Index or Vocabulary-Digit Span in isolation in samples similar to those used in the present study
is not recommended due to decreased specificity. Indeed, using only the WAIS-III/WMS-III,
32.4% of the Control group scored in the noncredible range on at least one validity indicator,
representing low specificity (high false positive rate), which highlights the need to use multiple
validity indicators (Larrabee, 2007a; Meyers & Volbrecht, 2003). However, singular indices may
serve utility as initial, preliminary screening measures of invalid test performance due to the
literature base that supports their usage. In this way, noting failure on one measure increases the
post-test odds of noncredibility, but does not confirm it. Nonetheless, the reason for high failure
rates on individual indices in the Control sample and No External Incentive group remains
somewhat unclear in this study especially considering patients with marked neurological patients
were excluded from this study. One explanation is that a proportion of clients classified in the No
External Incentive group actually had an incentive, but did not overtly make that known at the
time of the evaluation. Thus, the substantially lowered proportion meeting Criterion B likely
represents the lower limit of noncredible performance in this population, and those meeting
probable criteria for MND represent the extreme cases of MND.
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Hypothesis 4
It is hypothesized that those with self-reported pre-existing cognitive disorders will
have a lower rate of noncredible performance as they have previously established that they
have cognitive deficits in order to obtain external gain. Therefore, they may not feel the
need to exaggerate their deficits. The author also investigated the relationship of a self-reported
history of diagnosed cognitive problems and scoring below the cutoff on validity indices. It was
expected that those with such a history would not score below cutoff criteria on the validity
measures at a higher rate than those without that history. However, those with a history of
cognitive problems were more likely to present for testing to obtain accommodations at the
university and/or for standardized “high stakes” placement tests (e.g., American College Test,
etc.). Therefore, the external incentive to perform poorly on the neurocognitive testing was quite
salient in this subgroup of clients. As such, those with a history of cognitive problems and
scholastic struggles were actually more likely to meet Slick Criteria for probable MND than
those without that background. This may be partly due to previous involvement in
neurocognitive testing, resulting in familiarity with the fact that one needs to demonstrate (or
exaggerate) deficits in order to receive a diagnosis. As a result of experience with testing
situations and previous external gains as a function of that testing and disorder familiarity, the
effect may be similar to being coached as to the types of deficits needed to be accentuated to
obtain a diagnosis. It is thought that this possibility may be a function of time since diagnoses.
For example, the majority of individuals in the pre-existing diagnosis group may have recently
obtained diagnoses rather than being diagnosed in childhood. It was rationally derived that those
diagnosed in childhood would expect professions to retain their cognitive diagnosis by virtue of
long-standing problems and they would not feel the need to exaggerate deficits. Therefore, in the
future, it would be important to analyze differences in validity failure rates as a function of time
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since diagnoses (i.e., diagnosis rendered in childhood versus adulthood). To conclude, those
clients with pre-existing diagnoses presenting to clinics to establish a diagnosis to receive
external secondary gain may have a higher prior probability of exaggerating or feigning deficits,
contrary to this hypothesis, and raises the question of whether many of these previously
diagnosed individuals obtained their original diagnoses via simulation.
Hypothesis 5
It is expected that those meeting Slick Criteria for probable MND will be diagnosed
with current brain based disorders (e.g., Cognitive Disorder NOS, ADHD, LD) most
frequently as an outcome of their current psychoeducational evaluation. Initially, it was not
thought that this hypothesis was supported because the rate of any primary Axis I mental
disorders in the probable MND group (79.7%) was very similar to the rate in those not meeting
Slick Criteria (75%). However, a more fine-grained, theory-driven reanalysis showed that the
rate of being diagnosed with a brain-based disorder (e.g., ADHD, LD, Cognitive Disorder)
according to their current psychoeducational evaluation was increased in the probable MND
group (64%) compared with those not meeting probable MND criteria (49%). Therefore, those
meeting criteria for probable MND obtained a brain-based diagnosis more often than those
demonstrating wholly credible performance. In particular, those meeting Slick Criteria were
successful in feigning/exaggerating deficits to the extent that they obtained diagnoses to justify
receiving external gain.
Hypothesis 6
Those clients meeting criteria for probable MND were likely to be recommended to
receive academic accommodations and/or be recommended for a stimulant medication
consultation at a higher rate than those not meeting criteria for probable MND. Related to
hypothesis five, there was an association for clinical group status as 71% of the External
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Incentive group and 47% of those in the No External Incentive clinical group received such
recommendations based on current psychoeducational results. Moreover, those meeting Slick
Criteria for probable MND had a 75.4% rate of receiving recommendations as opposed to 58.7%
of the clients not meeting Slick Criteria.
As with the first, second, third, and fourth hypotheses, there was support for an
association of clinical group status (No External Incentive & External Incentive) with outcomes
from current testing and diagnoses. In this case, it was shown that the group of clients visiting
the clinic with explicit intentions of obtaining secondary gain did in fact receive a high rate of
desired recommendations. This finding was higher than expected given the low rates of probable
MND, suggesting that the estimation of probable MND was actually too low (high number of
false negatives). The sixth hypothesis also supported the assertion that those meeting probable
Slick Criteria actually succeeded in demonstrating a neurocognitive impairment profile that
warranted formal recommendations for academic accommodations and/or stimulant medication
referral. Furthermore, 70% of those in the External Incentive group (with the MND clients
removed) obtained desired recommendations, indicating a strong effect for seeking external gain.
Only a small percentage of those patients were identified as putting forth questionable effort at
the time of the evaluation via behavioral observations and none were diagnosed with MND. In
sum, university students seeking incentives appear to be able exaggerate symptoms to obtain
desired outcomes, and they are not likely identified without symptom validity testing.
Hypothesis 7
The specificity levels would be greater when those meeting the Slick Criteria for
probable MND are compared to the Control group rather than when compared to the No
External Incentive group and remaining External Incentive group. Following the findings
that the No External Incentive group failed the validity indices at a higher rate than the Control
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sample, specificity levels for each index followed this pattern (see Tables 19, 20, & 21). Despite
the fact that the instruments were validated with brain injured samples to establish cutoff criteria,
research has also shown higher failure rates in credible clinical samples compared with
nonpatient samples (Victor et al., In Press), which was also demonstrated by differential
specificity values in the No External Incentive and the clients seeking external incentive, but not
meeting Slick Criteria for MND. As a result of the varying specificity levels, predictive values of
the tests were altered with increasing classification certainty obtained when utilizing the Control
group as the comparison sample (see Table 20). The two poorest predictive values in the Control
participant comparison were those with the highest failure rate (Mittenberg Index and
Vocabulary minus Digits) as well.
Those two indices share validation samples in original research that did not include an
adequate proportion of participants with normal and high intellectual quotients as were present in
the current university sample. Since both of these indices are essentially based on utilizing a
subtest discrepancy analysis, the high failure rates in the current study may reflect problems with
applying that approach in high functioning samples. For instance, it has been widely noted that
subtest discrepancies on intelligence scales are more common in those with above average FSIQs
(Hawkins & Tulsky, 2001; Saklofske, Tulsky, Wilkins, & Weiss, 2003). While the Vocabulary
minus Digit Span index has been investigated in a large normative sample (Iverson & Tulsky,
2003), failure rates have not been stratified by overall intellectual level, which likely results in
underestimating the false positive rate of that index. No such normative comparisons with the
Mittenberg Index exist for WAIS-III standardization sample, and attempts to obtain the relevant
data have been unsuccessful (Psychological Corporation, personal communication, November
2007). Therefore, other data regarding the appropriate applicability of the two discrepancy based
validity indices to high FSIQ samples are lacking. Despite the high failure on those measures in
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normal controls, all other indices demonstrated excellent specificity ranging from 98.1 to 1.00.
In the current sample, there are at least three other reasons for why the specificity and
predictive values differed when comparing the MND group with the No External Incentive group
and the remaining credible clients in the External Incentive group and those rather than the
Control group. First, it may be that there was an actual increased “false positive” rate in the No
External Incentive group and the portion of those with external incentive that did not meet full
Criterion B evidence. Interpretation from other research illuminates this interpretation if the
operational definition of a false positive is declaring someone a malingerer based on Slick
Criteria. In this case, the test objectively over-identifies those who actually demonstrate credible
performance in the context of seeking an external gain as well as those without such motives.
Second, because of the retrospective group assignment, the “false positive” cases may actually
be true positives that were misassigned to the No External Incentive group, precluding the
application of the Slick Criteria to those clients (not meeting Criterion A). Thus, those clients
classified by testing as “false positives” clients in the No external Incentive group are actually
false negative cases due to the quasi-experimental manipulation and not due to the psychometric
characteristics of the failed validity indices, thus being initial classification errors. For example,
if a client was seeking external incentive, but did not explicitly state that, he or she would have
been misclassified into the No External Incentive group in the current study, contaminating the
purity of the experimental groups. Conversely, the established psychometric properties of the
indices and previous research may actually over identify credible patients, which would indicate
that the false positive findings in the No External Incentive group identified true cases of MND.
The last possibility, and perhaps the most overlooked in the research on MND, is that the
No External Incentive group contained several individuals seeking evaluation based on a priori
set of psychological needs to demonstrate personal pathology. Thus, the high “false positive”
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rates reflect a tendency to present with somatoform and/or factitious features, rendering the
testing noncredible. While Delis and Wetter (2007) and others (Binder, 2007; Boone, 2007a;
Larrabee, 2007b) have recognized that factors other than substantial external secondary gain may
relate to feigned neurocognitive performance, the area remains understudied. This is particularly
the case regarding the explanation of so-called false positive rates of validity tests in patient
samples with no apparent external incentives from participating in the evaluation process. In this
manner, false positive results are viewed as test properties while excluding other more recent
conceptualizations of somatic and cognitive symptom feigning, resulting in “overshadowing”
alternative explanations. Thus, the false positive rates reported in patient samples may reflect an
underlying cogniform syndrome that drives failures on neuropsychological validity tests and not
simply psychometric noise. This is potentially problematic given the high rates of suspected
noncredibility across settings, as effort and financial incentives have been shown to account for
significant variance in neuropsychological test performance (Binder & Rohling, 1996; Green et
al., 2001) and there are few guidelines in place to aid the clinician when deciding how to
interpret neurocognitive performance in the presence of failed validity testing and no apparent
external incentive.
Limitations
Although the general findings indicated that the External Incentive group performed
more poorly than the No External Incentive group on the subtests from the WAIS-III/WMS-III,
not all comparisons were statistically significant when applying parametric techniques. However,
nonparametrically, the significant overall tendency was that the External Incentive group
performed lower than the No External Incentive group much more often. The External Incentive
group scored significantly differently than the No External Incentive group on the validity
indices in an imperfectly consistent manner, though nonparametric results indicate the overall
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tendency to score in the direction noncredible direction.
Thus, the first two hypotheses were supported and some of the mild inconsistencies may
have been an experimental artifact in the grouping variables. For instance, the level of external
incentive seeking was determined via retrospective chart reviews wherein information regarding
the clients’ true reason for obtaining the evaluation may not have been, at times, explicitly stated.
Therefore, in those cases, the author grouped those clients into the No External Incentive group
as a means to avoid mislabeling those individuals as meeting criteria for MND in keeping with
the conservative approach in this study. Please note that in order to meet Slick Criteria, one has
to have external incentive (Criterion A). Because of this, the No External Incentive group likely
contained individuals who actually had an external incentive (i.e., seeking accommodations or
medications), but did not directly indicate their motivation at the time of evaluation, resulting in
a contaminated group. As a result, participants with external incentive were likely classified as
not having external incentive. Moreover, those misclassified clients could not meet Slick Criteria
as a function of that group assignment. However, that experimental artifact may actually bolster
the robustness of the significant findings because it is thought that those individuals that may
have been misclassified into the No External Incentive group should have performed similarly to
clients in the External Incentive group thereby diluting the group differences, which likely only
happened to a small degree. This potential situation would also be similar to typical clinical
practice where the clinician is often uncertain as to the clients’ explicit motivation for evaluation.
Additionally, it is also possible that a client’s explicit denial of external incentives may not be
credible because they may refuse to admit such motivational factors.
Despite the significant group differences, it may also be possible that those in the
External Incentive group may have performed lower on the WAIS-III/WMS-III due to
differences related to actual functioning. For instance, it could be that those with bonafide
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neurocognitive problems more readily expressed their intentions to receive external gain, and
were categorized as such. Be that as it may, the External Incentive group still performed toward
the noncredible range on the validity indices more often than the No External Incentive group,
which calls into question that possibility.
Another limitation of this study relates to the use of validity measures validated for use in
a medico-/psycholegal context and with neurological groups that have largely not included
clients diagnosed with ADHD or LD. Therefore, the appropriateness of assigning labels of
noncredible performance or malingering to clients in the present sample may be premature. To
counteract those concerns, the author utilized conservative cutoff scores to minimize false
positive findings of noncredible performance based on specificity levels across a number of
empirical findings.
The high number of control participants failing the Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary
minus Digit Span does call into question the use of cutscores for those measures in a university
sample. Each of those two indices is based on score discrepancies within the intellectual domain,
which may partially explain their low specificity in this sample given the increasing occurrence
of such discrepancies as IQ scores become higher and higher. For instance, it has been noted that
individuals with high intellectual quotients are more likely to show less uniform intellectual
abilities than those with low or average functioning (Hawkins & Tulsky, 2001). As a result, large
and frequent score discrepancies across intellectual abilities (i.e., a high degree of subtest scatter)
are expected in those with above average intelligence. Given that the control participants were
comprised of well-educated university students, the tendency for positive findings on the
Mittenberg Index and Vocabulary minus Digit Span may have reflected true discrepancies in
scores rather than noncredible performance. However, it has been shown that more extreme
performance on those validity indices indicates a greater degree of test invalidity (Greve et al.,
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2003; Mittenberg et al., 2001), which was also supported by the group comparisons but also
suggests that the cutoff score in this population may need modification for future use. This topic
also highlights that reliance on the observation of any single validity indicator is likely to result
in false findings of MND (Boone, 2007b; Bush et al., 2005; Larrabee, 2007a; Larrabee et al.,
2007; Meyers & Volbrecht, 2003; Rosenfeld et al., 2000; Victor et al., In Press). Therefore, the
use of a multiple methods and validity tests should be employed to guard against undue
stigmatization.
Perhaps the greatest limitation of the current study is that there was no independently
validated patient group meeting Slick Criteria using measures outside the scope of this study.
Because of this, it is not possible to definitively state that those meeting Slick Criteria according
to the current methodology were, in fact, feigning deficits in order to receive an external gain.
Nonetheless, the number of individuals meeting Slick Criteria in this study did not appear
excessive and was actually lower than expected given estimates of noncredible performance in
other clinical settings using samples motivated by different external incentives For instance,
according to Mittenberg et al. (2002), the rate of MND in patients not involved with litigation or
seeking compensation approximates 7% and the percentage in samples with high rates of
external incentives approaches 50%. The percentage of MND found in the current study falls
well below the high rate and just above the low estimate for MND in other clinical samples,
suggesting that the rate in the current study were reasonable.
While the current study did not include an independently validated group of patients
meeting research criteria for MND, the current literature base has not provided much technical
guidance in this area for the current population of interest. As noted above, nearly all of the
research on noncredible neurocognitive performance is concerned with forensic cases having
identifiable high stakes outcomes that affect public policy, service provision, and public as well
109

as private financial considerations. In fact, mention of nonforensic malingering in particular has
been sparse and vague (Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998) making it unclear
if current models of malingering and noncredible performance in forensic and other settings are
applicable to nonforensic clinical evaluations with less sensational external reasons for seeking
assessment. Therefore, there are no readily available instruments or methods that directly apply
to determine credible performance specifically for those seeking ADHD or LD evaluations,
which reflects the preliminary nature of this study and this area of research.
Conclusions
Neuropsychologists spend the majority of their time outside the realm of forensic practice
(Kanauss, Schatz, & Puente, 2005) and several sources of secondary gain independent of the
legal arena remain unstudied. The results from this project support extending research and
clinical investigation of noncredible performance to the academic setting as it was shown that
there was a relationship between overtly seeking non-financial external incentives and test
performance. More specifically, as a group, university students who overtly seek academic
accommodations and/or stimulant medications performed lower on neuropsychological measures
and showed more failure rates on validity indices than those not overtly seeking such incentives.
As a result, incentive-seeking can be conceptualized on a continuum that pertains to
influence of external incentives that includes the perception, desirability, and type of external
incentive. For instance, failure rates on neuropsychological validity indices and performance on
neuropsychological tests can be examined based on the degree of incentive present (financial,
employment status, non-financial awards, etc.). As it relates to the current study, further
investigations would be well-served to examine the various types of external academic incentives
(i.e., medication seeking, accommodation seeking) and neuropsychological performance.
So too, external pressures experienced by clients also need to be examined for an effect
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and interaction with incentive levels. For instance, in a forensic context, an independently
wealthy claimant may not view a potential legal $1,000 award as enticing as someone who was
in debt and laid off of work. In terms of academics, students with high pressure to perform
scholastically (i.e., low GPA, students on academic probation) may view particular academic
accommodations as being differentially attractive versus honor students with high GPA.
Therefore, it will be necessary to further refine and more clearly operationalize how substantial
particular external incentives may be viewed in the context of neuropsychological evaluations. In
this vein, a theoretically-driven approach to studying noncredible performance in the context of
external incentives may be offered in order to elucidate otherwise difficult to explain poor
neuropsychological performance.
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